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ABSTRACT
Charter schools have been categorized as "everyone's reform" (Bracey, 2004);
they are a type of public school, first established in 1992, that normally has fewer
restrictions than most public schools and that serves a student body that, in many
circumstances, has consciously opted to attend the school. Charter schools have promised
high student achievement and program options that would create healthy competition in
the American educational market. Currently, in California alone, there are approximately
800 active charter schools that serve more than 340,000 pupils.
As we close in on nearly twenty years of charter school reform, many charter
schools could be considered successful. Every year, however, some have their charters
either revoked or not renewed due to a variety of reasons including deficiencies in
academic programming, poor student achievement, or improper fiscal mismanagement.
According to the California Department of Education (2010), twenty-five percent of the
1,152 charter schools that have opened in California since 1992 have closed permanently,
with more than forty closings due to charter revocation. To date, however, there has been
very little research on charter school closures.
This qualitative study attempted to (a) determine which types of California charter
schools have closed, (b) discover the reasons the schools' former leaders give for the
closures, as well as compare official reasons for closure with the schools' former leaders
stated reasons for closure, and (c) solicit any advice the former leaders would offer others
wanting to begin, or continue to successfully operate, a charter school.
Reasons the former directors gave for their schools' closures included: (a) conflict
with their sponsoring agent, (b) a negative relationship with their superintendent, (c)

problems with facilities, (d) financial problems, (e) working ineffectively with a business
partner, and (f) perceived unethical behavior by a business partner. Advice offered by
these directors included the importance of securing and controlling finances at the site
level, developing and maintaining collaborative relationships with sponsoring agents,
beginning a charter school with a specific vision, not allowing a business entity to operate
a charter school, and maintaining a high level of energy and enthusiasm.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Bracey (2004) has categorized charter schools as "everyone's reform." This
statement suggests that a diverse constituency—everyone from those who supported the
"alternative school" movement of the 1970s to those who support vouchers to politicians,
parents, and educators of varied philosophical and pedagogical persuasions—has
embraced the potential charter school solution to our nation's educational problems.
Charter schools are a type of public school, a type that was first established in
1992. They are typically started by educators, parents, or some other organized group,
sponsored by a state or local school board, and governed by a charter that creates
autonomy at the school level and independence in the educational choices for teachers,
parents, and students.
Charter schools, in fact, were designed to provide more freedom for educators
and parents who felt that their current set of educational choices was highly constrained.
In exchange for this new-found freedom, charter school operators are given responsibility
for improving student achievement and insuring proper fiscal management. In fact,
charter schools have the same requirements as other schools under the Federal No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2008. This act, in part, requires schools to achieve
"Adequate Yearly Progress" (AYP) toward specified targeted increases in standardized
test scores. Charter schools are expected to meet either the goals set forth in their charter,
or the AYP goals set by NCLB, whichever are more rigorous. If a school, whether a
regular public school or a charter school, does not meet the minimum AYP requirements,
a possible consequence is reorganization of that school, including replacing faculty and
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administrators. Additionally, students in schools (including charter schools) that are not
meeting or exceeding AYP goals may receive supplemental services and the choice to opt
out of the school they attend and move to another school within the district (Hill and
Guin, 2003). Ironically, if traditional public schools do not meet their AYP goals, one of
the state's suggested remedies is to convert them into charter schools.
As we close in on nearly twenty years of charter school reform, many charter
schools could be considered successful (Hill & Lake, 2002; Hoxby, 2004; Edwards et. al.,
2009). However, there are charter schools that have either closed or have had their
charters revoked by the agency that sponsored them in the first place. The charter
community, as well as the public school community at large, can learn tremendous
amounts of valuable information through quantitative and qualitative analysis of these
closed charter schools.
Background to the Study
As has already been noted above, charter schools are public schools that are
overseen by charter authorizers and supported, financially and/or in other ways, by
official sponsors. Charter schools are guided by a charter petition which outlines the
purpose, vision, and mission of the school. Manno, Vanourek and Finn (2000) describe
charter schools as organizations that offer us insight into what a revitalized and more
responsible public education system might look like.
Minnesota passed the first charter school law in 1991, and the first United States
charter school opened in that state in 1992. California soon followed, passing charter
school law in 1992. There are currently more than 3,500 charter schools operating
nationwide; these schools serve over one million students.
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In California alone, there are approximately 800 active charter schools with more
than 340,000 pupils. Within this group of California charter schools, Wells, Lopez, Scott,
and Holme (1999) found that California charter schools generally fit into six categories:
a) urban, ethnocentric, and grassroots charters, b) home schooling/independent study
programs, c) charter schools founded by charismatic educational leaders, d) teacher-led
charters, e) parent-led charters, and finally, f) entrepreneur initiated charters. These
categories will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Two.
The reasons for the initial and continued infusion of charter schools into the
California educational system in particular are summarized by the Excellence in Public
Education Facilities Department (CA) as follows:
Public charter schools offer an important and timely public school option to
address the challenges facing our traditional education system. Charter schools
are an exciting and high-potential alternative for the following reasons:
1) Most efforts to reform high-need public schools in California have failed.
Charter schools provide parents the opportunity to offer real input in their child's
education.
2) Charter schools give educators freedom to try new strategies to inspire student
achievement.
3) Charter schools, less encumbered by the bureaucratic barriers that face other
public schools, have the potential to spark system-wide change.
Charter schools are schools of choice for many children and their families.
Charter school advocates and opponents alike are also interested in whether or not
charter schools have had an impact on the current educational system. The logic, here, is
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simple: Since charter schools are public schools, the act of sharing their successes and
failures has the potential to improve the achievement of students in traditional public
schools.
Of course, not all charter schools are successful. Every year a substantial number
of charter schools have their charters either revoked or not renewed. According to Gary
Larson from the California Charter Schools Association, about eight percent of charter
schools either close voluntarily or are forced to shut down by their districts due to issues
such as mismanagement or lack of facilities (Gao, 2006). At the very least, the closure of
charter schools provides a potential learning opportunity; often, more can be learned from
failure than success. The lessons learned from studying the reasons behind charter school
closures should be useful both to those who want to start other charter schools and also
those within the existing educational system who want to develop a deeper understanding
of schools and the problems within them.
Statement of the Problem
Unfortunately, up to this point, there has been very little research on charter
schools that have closed. We do know that some charter schools are closing, either
because they have had their charters revoked or not renewed by their charter authorizer,
or as a result of a self-initiated process. According to the California Department of
Education (2010), twenty-five percent of the 1,152 charter schools that have opened in
California since 1992 have closed permanently, with more than forty closings due to
charter revocation.
We also know that, historically, the main reasons leading to charter school
closures have been faulty management or deficiencies in academic programming
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(Vergari, 1999). The U.S. Department of Education, for example, indicates that "failure
to meet student achievement goals and expectations" is one of the most frequent reasons
that charters are revoked. The achievement goal issue can be more complex for charter
schools than for traditional public schools. Although the California Charter Act of 1992
holds schools accountable for meeting student outcomes, some charter schools may
conceivably meet the academic goals set forth in their charter but fail according to the
standards specified in the NCLB Act.
Whatever the reasons are for charter schools' closures, the literature available
does not clearly specify which types of charters are closing, nor does the research fully
describe terms, such as "faulty management" or "deficiencies in the academic program."
The opinions and advice of those involved with the closed schools—for example,
administrators, directors and/or principals—have not been explored in any systematic
way. As a result, it is not clear what suggested precautionary measures leaders of other
charter schools might undertake to avoid shutting the doors of their charter schools.
According to the National Study of Charter Schools conducted by the U. S.
Department of Education (1998), charter schools that have been forced— or that have
decided on their own— to close, represent a very small proportion of the number of
schools granted charters. A study conducted in 2002 by The Center for Educational
Reform found, once again, that the number of closures was relatively small when
compared to the growing number of charter schools that have been created.
Unfortunately, neither study explored the reasons for closure from the perspective of the
administrators that worked at those particular schools. Consequently, there is a need to
study charter schools that have closed and why closures have occurred, so that those
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interested in opening charter schools in the future may learn from their colleagues'
unique experiences.
Additionally, as noted above, traditional public schools that have failed in the
eyes of the federal government may convert to charter school status under the regulations
ofNCLB. Those involved in this transitional process may also benefit from the lessons
learned by those who have been a part of a charter school closure.
Purpose of the Study
This study, therefore, attempted to discover the internal and external reason(s) the
schools' former leaders give for the closures, investigate what (if anything) those
administrators involved feel could have prevented closure, and explore the advice they
would give to current and future charter school leaders. Schools categorized as
employing home schooling/independent study programs were initially excluded from this
study, since the focus of the study is on charter schools in physical locations that are
more reflective of typical educational settings; however, two schools were
miscategorized within closure documentation, and I did not clearly understand their
hybrid nature (a combination of independent study and onsite student/teacher meetings)
until the qualitative interviews occurred. Charter schools identified by the U.S.
Department of Education as "abandoned," "inactive," or "withdrawn" are also not
included in this study. These identifiers are unpacked more fully in Chapter Three of this
study.
The following questions were the initial guide for this dissertation study:
1) Using the Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme (1999) typology, which types of
California charter schools have closed?
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2) What are the reasons for the school closure?
a) What was the official legal reason for closure?
b) What reasons do administrators give for the school closing?
3) In retrospect, what, if anything, do the administrators of closed charter schools
believe could have been done (through training, education, or other means) to
prevent the school from closing?
4) What information do the administrators feel would be helpful to those wanting to
open charter schools in the future?
The study, however, changed as data were collected. The explanation of the evolution
of the study is addressed further in Chapter Three. This study now addresses the
following two research questions:
1) What are the reasons former charter school leaders give for the closure of their
schools?
2) What advice do these former charter school leaders offer to those who are
interested in starting or continuing a charter school?
Significance of the Study
In addition to assisting those who are interested in starting and/or maintaining
charter school status, this study impacts those involved in traditional public schools due
to the requirements of NCLB. According to the U.S. Department of Education (2010),
children who attend schools that are identified as needing improvement have the
opportunity to attend charter schools within their district. Results of this study can
influence how traditional public school management can improve their practices so that
they can meet the federal goals set forth for them. Additionally, schools that remain in the
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"needs improvement" category according to NCLB for more than three years are subject
to corrective action and restructuring (including a takeover or complete reorganization of
the school), which includes converting a school to charter school status. The results of
this dissertation study may be of help to those who find themselves converting from
traditional public school to charter school status. Finally, the information gathered from
this study can assist those colleges and universities that are considering or currently
operating charter school development programs. The conclusions from this study could
guide curriculum development and impact the incorporation of certain key elements into
college programs that will help train successful charter school operators and employees.
Overview of Subsequent Chapters
Chapter Two situates this study in the context of current charter school literature
by organizing the literature into categories which are helpful in analyzing and evaluating
charter school performance, successes, and closures. Chapter Three describes the original
research design, the problems that arose with that design, and the methods that were
employed in the re-designed study. Chapter Four presents the case studies that were
constructed from the interview data, as well as cross-case analysis which generated
themes across some of the case studies. The final chapter focuses on the issues that
emerged when looking across the nine cases, discusses implications for policy and
practice, and considers the implications of this study for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This dissertation study will examine charter schools that have closed with an eye
toward beginning to understand the issues mentioned in the previous chapter. Before
describing the methods that will be used in this examination, however, the existing
literature will be reviewed. The review will be organized around the following topics:
characteristics of charter schools, charter schools' impact on the existing educational
system, measures of success and achievement, and charter school problems/ reasons for
failure.
Characteristics of Charter Schools
Typologies
According to Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme (1999), there are six categories of
charter schools:
(a). Urban/Ethnocentric/Grassroots: these schools are born out of frustration with an
educational system that does not address a particular group's history, needs, or
experiences.
(b). Home school/independent study: These schools attract a wide variety of families
who have the freedom to spend time with their children and who range from
conservative to liberal.
(c). Charters founded by charismatic educational leaders: Schools in this category are
founded on a desire for more curricular, pedagogical, and/or fiscal autonomy from the
local school district.
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(d). Teacher-led charters: Schools in this category are more focused on instructional
programs and also tend to be conversion schools (schools that had previously been
traditional public schools).
(e). Parent-led charters: These charter schools have a core of extremely involved
parents who work with educators to move toward writing policies and procedures for
the charter.
(f). Entrepreneur-initiated charters: These schools are typically in urban areas and
tend to serve at-risk populations.
Although the use of the categories developed in the above-mentioned study is
appropriate for this dissertation since Wells et. al. developed the typology exclusively
utilizing California charter schools, it is important to take note of searches for other
typologies and other attempts to categorize charter schools. Carpenter (2005), for
instance, found that charter schools in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and Texas
fell into five categories: traditional, progressive, vocational, general and alternative
delivery. As defined in the aforementioned study, traditional charter schools "stress high
standards in academics and behavior, rigorous classes, lots of homework, and other
earmarks of a back-to-basics approach" (p. 3). Progressive charter schools focus on
holistic learning and emphasize "student-centered, hands-on, project-based, and
cooperative" (p. 4) activities. Vocational charter schools focus on practicality and workstudy programs that give students real life experiences in their education. General charter
schools in no way look any different than other traditional public schools in the district in
which they reside. These schools tended to be conversion charter schools—schools that
converted from a traditional public school to a charter school for a variety of reasons.
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Finally, alternative delivery charter schools include home study and/or virtual, online
classroom approaches to teaching and learning.
Another study categorized charter schools by their founding organizations or
organizers (Henig, Holyoke, Brown, & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005). The general categories
generated from this multiple state study were mission-oriented and market-oriented
schools. Little evidence was found to document variations across the two categories.
Results of this study indicated that "external environment and core educational tasks may
impose similar patterns of behavior on charter schools regardless of their differing
organizational roots" (p. 37).
Measures of Success and Achievement
It can be argued that charter schools were invented, partially, to create greater
accountability in public school education (Manno and Finn, 1998). Student achievement
is invariably linked to accountability, which in turn affects the success or failure of a
charter school. This section will review literature on accountability, student achievement,
and factors that influence student achievement within the charter school movement.
Accountability
According to Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001), charter school accountability is "the
process by which authorizers of charter schools and other stakeholders, such as parents
and students, ensure that charter schools meet their goals" (p. 348). Accountability has
been found to be the most challenging issue surrounding charter schools in existence for
at least five years (Manno, Finn, and Vanourek, 2000). The United States Department of
Education, in fact, indicates that "the failure to meet student achievement goals and
expectations" as one of the three most frequently cited reasons that charters are revoked.
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Because charter schools have more freedom, they are also seen as having a greater
responsibility and greater accountability. As public schools, charter schools are
accountable for, primarily, the use of their funds and student achievement. If anything,
accountability pressures are greater in charter schools than in regular schools because the
price for that freedom from rules and regulations is accountability and results (Bracey,
2005; Griffin and Wohlstetter, 2001).
The California Charter Act of 1992 holds charter schools accountable for meeting
measurable student outcomes (such as California standardized tests and the California
High School Exit Exam). Charter schools in California must participate in the same statewide testing as non-charter public schools and are required to meet their Annual Yearly
Progress under the stipulations of NCLB.
California charter school law provides a method of switching from rule-based
(certain things must be done) to performance-based (results are what matter)
accountability systems (Edwards et. al., 2009). Charter schools in California may utilize
assessment tools other than state tests—e.g., various forms of performance-based
assessment—as part of the school's own instructional program to determine whether or
not there is student growth in academic achievement.
Some charter school supporters point to the closure of charter schools as evidence
that the charter concept works. By this, they mean that charter schools are being held
accountable and will be closed if they do not succeed on a variety of levels (U. S.
Department of Education, 1998).
The examination of charter schools suggests another kind of accountability to
which charter schools are subject. As eluded to earlier, charter schools have the potential
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to serve as labs for the rest of the educational community (Adelman, 2000). Research
conducted by Bohte (2004) suggests that charter schools may promote systemic
improvements in public education. A legitimate question, therefore, is: Have charter
schools lived up to the expectation that they will stimulate change in the existing
educational system?
A number of studies conclude that charter schools modestly influence overall
performance improvements for students enrolled in comparable traditional public schools
(Bohte, 2004; Zimmer et. al., 2003; Manno et. al., 2000). In a report entitled, "Charter
Schools: Still Making Waves'", The Center for Education Reform (2005) states that the
presence of charter schools in a district does appear to help bring about stronger
performance gains for students enrolled in traditional public schools in the same district
or geographic area. For example, a study done by Hoxby in 2001 demonstrated that
traditional public schools in Arizona and Michigan that had charter schools in close
proximity showed greater scores in math and/or reading than traditional public schools
that did not have charters within their areas. Although the finding may seem positive for
charter schools, it is unclear whether or not selection bias was taken into account; in other
words, parents or caregivers who choose to send their children to charter schools seem to
be well-informed, know their options for educational choices, and typically intend to send
their children to a particular charter school.
On the other hand, some charter schools maintain their neighborhood school
status. In these cases, parents simply send their child to the charter school because it is
the local school their child would have attended whether or not the school was charter.
What is clear, however, is that charter schools, in at least some cases, create a market-like
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environment that offer parents and students the ability to leave under-performing schools
and attend more innovative and less bureaucratic educational settings.
In theory, charter schools commit themselves to educational outcomes through
charter contracts. Each charter school contract is a compact that binds the school to
certain student outcomes and a system of accountability in exchange for state funds. As
mentioned earlier, states relieve charter schools from certain state laws and regulations in
exchange for charter petitions and agreements that outline specific outcomes. Educational
plans and precise educational goals for students must be articulated in the charter, along
with the means to achieve the defined end (Mead & Green, 2001).
Charter schools are also held accountable by presenting their progress to their
chartering agency (generally every five years, depending on the terms of the state's
charter school laws) in order to renew their charter school status. Charter school laws
from state to state typically require three specific criteria (Griffin & Wohlstetter, 2001;
Finn, Bierlein & Manno, 1996):
(a). Reasonable progress on meeting each school's own goals for its students.
(b). Standards of fiscal management concerning the proper use of funds.
(c). General probity and avoidance of scandal.
How these criteria are measured as well as the definitions of terms such as "reasonable,"
"proper use of funds," and "scandal" are unclear and vary from state to state and district
to district.
Although there are some similar (albeit general) requirements that all charter
schools are accountable for, one factor is certain: charter schools must be held

15

responsible for producing high student performance. The next subtopic reviews some of
the key literature on the topic of student achievement.
Student Achievement
This section is divided into two topics. First, I will discuss the comparisons made
between the student achievement in charter and non-charter schools. Second, I will
introduce and analyze the literature regarding the use of standardized testing to measure
student achievement in charter schools.
Comparisons between charter and non-charter schools. Current research
demonstrates inconsistency and contradictory findings with respect to whether or not
charter schools are more effective than traditional schools in promoting higher student
achievement (Slovacek, et. al., 2002; Hill & Lake, 2002; Manno, 2001). For example, in
February 2002, the Boston Herald reported that many charter schools were outperforming
schools in their home districts. The San Joaquin Record (February 2006) also detailed the
above-average Academic Performance Index scores of three local area charter schools.
Conversely, Newsweek (July 2002) and The New York Times (August 2006) noted that
recent reports on charter schools reflect that charters are not fulfilling all of their
promises of better educational performance.
Hill and Lake (2002) compared test scores between charter schools and traditional
public schools in ten states. The socioeconomic status and race of students were
controlled in establishing comparison groups. Additionally, test scores were weighted to
reflect school size. The study's findings indicated that, while Colorado charter schools
had outperformed their non-charter public school counterparts at a statistically significant
level, the charter schools in the other states had not.
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Another study conducted by Carolyn Hoxby of Harvard University (2004)
compared fourth grade students' reading and math proficiency in charter schools and
traditional public schools in the same neighborhoods. Hoxby compared elementary
charter schools with traditional elementary neighborhood schools that had similar student
populations. In the study by Hoxby, charter students generally outperformed their peers
in states where charter schools are well-established. There is a potential problem with the
design of Hoxby's study, however. Although charter schools and traditional public
schools may share neighborhoods, their student populations may be slightly to
dramatically different due to enrollment procedures, even if charter schools use lotteries
as the author suggests. Many times, the families that "opt in" to charter schools are wellinformed and select the charter school carefully. Additionally, this study only looked at
fourth grade standardized test scores, although the study included ninety-nine percent of
elementary charter schools.
A logistic regression study that controlled for school characteristics and was
conducted by researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2004) concluded that
in all but one eighth grade level cohort, "charter schools are better than traditional public
schools at insuring that students achieve the proficient level of performance" (p. 26). As
mentioned with the Hoxby study, this study does not seem to have been controlled for
selection bias and, consequently, for selection effects.
Finally, another study reported by the Charter School Development Center in
2003 suggests that charter school performance may increase with time. The study found
California charter schools open for five or more years outperformed all California
traditional public schools; however, California charter schools open for less than five
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years fell behind all California traditional public schools and California charter schools
open for five or more years. This report utilized standardized test scores (the California
Standards Test and California High School Exit Exam) to compare the groups of schools.
According to this study, over 60% of charter schools did not receive API growth scores,
and 40% did not receive base scores. The only two comparison categories in this study
were "all public schools" and "active charter schools," with the "active charter schools"
separated into those open for more than five years and those open less than five years. As
has been the case with most studies that compare student achievement in traditional
public schools with student achievement in charter schools, selection bias could be a
factor in this study and could possibly impact student performance.
Since 1997, there have been eight Federal reports on charter schools issued by the
U. S. Department of Education. These reports generally have concluded that charter
schools are performing below traditional public schools. For example, in the 2004
Evaluation of the Public Charter School Program, charter schools in five states cited in
the report were less likely to meet the state performance standards than the traditional
public schools. The reasons for the underperformance are unclear, however, and are not
addressed in the report.
Additionally, the American Federation of Teachers reported poor charter school
performance in their 2004 Charter School Achievement on the 2003 National Assessment
of Educational Progress. According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP), students in charter schools had lower achievement in grades four and eight
compared to traditional public school students. Additionally, there were less charter
school students performing at the "at or above Basic" and "at or above Proficient" levels
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as compared to traditional public school peers. As with other studies, the two comparison
categories were "charter" and "other public". Furthermore, the only measurement utilized
was standardized test scores.
In 2009, EdSource published a Performance Update on California charter schools.
After adjusting for differences in student demographics, such as average parent
education, special program participation (e.g., Free and Reduced Lunch, English
Language Learner programs, and Special Education), and student ethnicity, three key
conclusions were found:
(a). Charter high school students scored moderately higher on standardized tests than
their non-charter high school peers in English, but lower in math.
(b). Charter middle school students outscored their non-charter school counterparts on
standardized tests.
(c). Students in charter elementary schools scored lower on standardized tests than
students in non-charter elementary schools.
Once again, the only measurement utilized was standardized test scores, and selection
bias could contribute to students' performance on standardized tests.
Current literature is often unclear as to how or to what degree charter schools are
measured, and whether or not they are more successful than their traditional public school
counterparts. Scarce are longitudinal studies that truly compare similar charter schools.
Evidence as to whether or not charter schools cause increased academic achievement is
limited. Additionally, new charter schools will challenge old ways of thinking, and will
question current methods of learning and performance; charter schools introduce the
possibility of evaluating schools using a different scale (Kolderie, 2005).
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However, since the use of standardized tests to measure student achievement is so
universally accepted and, more often than not, required, the following section will
specifically discuss the use of standardized testing to determine student achievement in
the charter school setting.
Standardized testing. According to Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001), the majority
of charter schools still use standardized tests as the primary means for measuring the
success or failure of their programs. Lack of experience, expertise, and time, as well as
state and federal mandates, cause charter school operators and teachers to fall back on
assessments that are already in existence, even though those assessments may not
accurately measure the student population a particular charter school is serving or the
unique goals it is pursuing. A lack of proper growth measurement means that many
charter schools lack precise operational goals against which their performance can be
measured. To add to the ambiguity and confusion, the criteria for charter renewal have
yet to be clearly specified in many states (Hess, 2001; Vegari, 1999). The data reported
are very much dependent on who is providing the numbers.
Some charters could conceivably meet the goals stated in their charters, but fail
when measured solely by standardized test results. This conflict is explained by Manno:
It's vital for a charter operator to recognize that items like state-wide tests are part
of the accountability deal with the state and the charter authorizer. It is naive to
design a curriculum that doesn't prepare students to do well on them. Conversely,
the chartering authority must realize both on the testing side and when designing
other forms of accountability monitoring, that if it wants some school to be truly
different—especially if it wants them to serve at-risk youngsters—it has got to be
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imaginative and sensitive in monitoring their performance. There is no simple
solution to this dilemma, but a charter accountability compact should be clear
about what's expected by the charter authorizer. (Manno, 1999. p. 429)
Using standardized tests as a single indicator of charter school performance is
flawed. Standardized tests are not completely accurate if used as an independent measure
of success or failure, since these types of tests may not uniformly measure student
performance or growth (Agostini, 2003). The problem is often compounded in that
charter schools, by design, have their own idiosyncratic goals along with more
conventionally accepted ones.
Factors That Influence Student Achievement
There are many factors that impact student achievement. This section will review
school culture and the impact of autonomy as two key areas that the literature identifies
as influences on the performance of students in charter schools.
School culture. School culture includes a collection of the values, beliefs, and
practices shared and exhibited by members of a school organization (Peterson & Deal,
1998; Wagner, 2006). According to Paris (1998), the reality of reform is defined as
creating a culture of belief—believing in one's goals and the ability to achieve them.
Paris discusses the philosophies behind meeting the standards (i.e. academic
achievement) and the creation of charter schools. According to Paris, freeing up
professionals to implement innovative strategies will lead to real change. The author sees
culture, not necessarily a particular instructional strategy or assessment, as critical.
The idea of school culture is seen again in a 1999 study conducted by Wayson.
Wayson suggests that the culture of traditional and charter schools, not the label of the
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school, is a primary source of student achievement. The author notes the reasons for the
creation of charter schools can be linked to global economic competition, low
achievement, poor discipline, private schools' perceived superiority, and declining social
values. Charter schools provide more choice for parents, and allow teachers to be more
innovative and address student needs more appropriately. It is unclear, however, whether
or not it is easier to achieve the culture the author describes in charter schools versus
traditional public schools.
Autonomy. Some would argue that autonomy is at the heart of charter school
success and positive student achievement. A study conducted by Wohlstetter, Wenning,
and Briggs (1995) focused on conditions that are necessary for charter schools to operate
autonomously in order to enhance student achievement. The authors evaluated the charter
school legislation and levels of autonomy attributed to charter schools in eleven states.
Based on the authors' evaluation of the schools, and corresponding charter school law,
autonomy is defined as the absence of constraints from external sources, but not complete
freedom. The authors conclude that autonomy from higher levels of government, local
autonomy (specifying own goals and programs and methods for achieving said goals),
and consumer sovereignty all contribute to charter school success.
In his book, The Charter School Challenge: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Fulfilling the
Promise, Hassel (1999) maintains that "without autonomy, charter schools cannot
provide unique educational options for children. They cannot serve as experimental
laboratories or lighthouses from which other children can learn" (p. 78). The author's
statement is inferred from his conclusions regarding existing charter school research.
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Additionally, Stewart (2002) defines the link between charter school autonomy
and student achievement:
Charter schools allow educational designers the freedom to conceive and execute
academic programs that must meet specific state standards and criteria but have
extreme latitude in the design of methods to reach those standards. Thus, a charter
school can be designed based on an educational model that is deemed by the
designers to afford the best path for students toward achievement, (p.6)
The author bases her conclusion on a single case study of a charter school in Houston.
Although a case study can allow for detailed and often intimate findings, it is difficult to
generalize the conclusions.
Charter Schools' Impact on the Existing Educational System
Charter school advocates and opponents alike are interested in whether or not
charter schools have an impact on the current educational system. Adelman (2000)
discusses the potential of charter schools to serve as labs for the rest of the educational
community. Experiments, as Adelman states, do not necessarily succeed or fail; they
prove or disprove current instructional practices, school structure, and educational
philosophies. Charter schools are public schools, so the act of sharing successes and
failures has the potential to improve the achievement of students in traditional public
schools.
There are barriers to the sort of sharing that Adelman alludes to, however.
Common barriers associated with collaborative efforts between charter schools and
traditional public schools include: scarcity of time and resources, type of charter school,
and the charter granting agency. Also, there seems to be little collaboration between
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leaders of traditional public schools and leaders of charter schools. Sometimes, there are
even adversarial relationships that develop between the two. In a January 2010 interview
on MSNBC's Morning Joe, the president of the American Federation of Teachers
commented on the strained relationship between traditional schools and charter schools in
the state of New York. The problem, she summarized, is that the system needs to ensure
that charter schools are "taking the same kids as all other public schools."
O'Sullivan, Nagle, and Spence (2000) conducted surveys of districts and charter
schools in North Carolina to find the impact of charter schools on their local school
districts in the first year of charter school existence in that state. Thirty-four charter
schools and their twenty-four districts were included. Most districts and their charter
schools viewed their relationships as fair or good. Charter school directors saw their
schools as instruments of change for their districts. Districts viewed charter schools as
having serious financial implications. Districts and charter school personnel saw charters
as increasing the number of schools of choice and enhancing district public relations
efforts. In conclusion, the perceived impact of charter schools varied: charter school
employees viewed their impact as positive, while district employees saw charter school's
impact primarily as that of a financial burden.
A comparative study of Colorado teachers found that charter school teachers and
traditional public school teachers are more alike than they are different (Bomotti,
Ginsber, and Cobb, 2000). The fact that teachers in both settings are more similar than
different suggests that charter schools have not excelled in areas of innovation or positive
impact as initially envisioned; consequently, the authors conclude that they do not have
the sort of positive impact as initially envisioned. In contrast, Rofes (1998) established
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that the cultures and climates of nearby traditional public schools almost always changed
when a new charter school came into the community, but these changes were not
predictable.
Results of a study conducted by Bohte (2004) demonstrated that charter schools
contribute to modest overall performance improvements for students enrolled in
traditional public schools. Charter schools help bring about stronger performance gains
for low-income students enrolled in traditional public schools. Bohte's argument is that
charter schools create a market-like environment that offer parents and students the
ability to leave under-performing schools and attend more innovative and less
bureaucratic educational settings. Bohte believes that charter schools may promote
systemic improvements in public education. Conversely, data from a 2002 study by
Howe and Betebenner indicated that school choice had not resulted in improved
achievement in the district.
Russo and Massucci (1999) found five reasons to support the finding that charter
school laws have less impact on large urban districts than in other areas. Most urban
districts experience increasing school-aged populations, most large urban districts contain
only a few charter schools, more time is needed to study charter school law since most
urban charter schools have existed for approximately ten years, urban charter schools are
difficult to reform because of their size, and some urban districts viewed charter schools
as a distraction. A 2005 study by Gregg Vanourek suggested that charter schools have yet
to demonstrate significant impact on the traditional public schools in their areas and/or
districts.
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Problems with Charter Schools and Reasons for Failure
The development and maintenance of a charter school can be an arduous process
which must balance curriculum, finances, marketing, and the daily maintenance of an
organization which affects so many children's lives (Nathan, 1996). Along with the
growth and responsibility of developing and maintaining a charter school comes the
unavoidable need for some charter schools to close.
Closures
This section of the literature review discusses the current number of charter
school closures, as well as the legal reasons for the closures, and areas of need for charter
schools.
Number of closures. As of February 2010, the Center for Educational Reform
reported that six hundred fifty seven charter schools have closed across the nation since
1992. This number represents over twelve percent of all charters ever opened.
Although specific numbers seem to vary, according to the Center for Education
Reform web site (2010), of the more than nine hundred and fifty charter schools that have
opened since California enacted charter school law in 1992, over one hundred schools (or
about eleven percent) have closed. Ninety-five percent of closures occur within five
years.
Legal reasons for closures. As of 2001, most charter school closures nationwide
were due to fiscal, administrative, or ethical violations, but few had been closed due to
under-performance (Griffin & Wohlstetter, 2001). A 2002 study by the Center for
Education Reform (CER) found that out of one hundred ninety-four charter school
closures, nine percent were due to facility issues. Of the eighty-four that never opened
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after receiving their charter, twenty-seven percent were due to facility issues (for
example, failure to secure a physical location or inadequate space). Since various centers
and research groups report "closures" differently, there are major discrepancies in the
research as to how many charter schools have closed, what types of charter schools have
closed, and for what reasons. Manno has reported that, since charter schools first opened,
more than two hundred failed (or failing) schools have been closed on fiscal, educational,
and organizational grounds (2002).
In 2009, the National Charter Schools Institute published a report by Dr. Brian L.
Carpenter regarding charter schools that had closed through 2007. Carpenter focused his
study on charter school authorizers. Out of a pool of 878 agencies which authorized
charter schools across the nation, 454 responded to his request for information. Of those
454 agencies, 83 stated that they had closed at least one charter school. Interviews were
conducted with 52% of those 83 agencies, which represented 100 closed charter schools
in nineteen states. This study suggested the following "lessons" we should learn from
charter schools that had closed:
(a). Insufficient enrollment is the reason most charters closed.
(b). Sloppy governance was prevalent in schools that closed.
(c). When non-renewal occurred, academic underperformance was the most common
reason.
(d). On average, most dissolved charter schools operated less than five years.
(e). More than a fifth of failed schools mismanaged their financial affairs (Carpenter,
2009).
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This study did not include some large states (e.g., Arizona) that have a significant number
of charter schools. Also, as mentioned earlier, this study focused on the perspectives of
charter school authorizers. Charter school authorizers may or may not have a true
understanding of the day-to-day activities and procedures that occur at the school once
the charter has been authorized. Authorizers may want to see academic growth after a
three or five year renewal period, but beyond that, there is variation in their level of
involvement on the front lines of charter school operation.
Carpenter also offered suggestions after each "lesson" that was learned. The issue
with those suggestions, however, is that they were intended for three groups: charter
boards/executives, state associations, and authorizers. There was no mention of
suggestions for those who dealt with the operation of the charter schools on a consistent
and regular basis. Since "executives" are in the same suggestion category as "charter
boards", it is unclear whether executives include personnel such as the directors,
administrators, or principals.
Areas of Need
A study done by Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001) utilized focus groups that were
comprised of charter school directors/founders, administration, and teachers from Boston,
Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. Among other things, the focus groups revealed that there
were some difficulties associated with developing coherent instructional programs. These
difficulties were caused by vague school missions and the pressure to create something
quickly within a short timeframe. Accountability systems were usually created internally,
and consequences for poor student performance from one district to another were
inconsistent. Finally, this study uncovered that many charter school leaders exhibited a
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rebellious attitude, which typically stemmed from challenging the status quo while inside
the traditional public school system.
In a significant finding in their research, Griffin and Wohlstetter discovered the
following:
The ability of charter school leaders to create an effective balance oftentimes
appeared to be hampered by their lack of professional knowledge and experience
in the management area. Few charter school leaders had a strong professional
understanding of participative management or high-involvement organizations,
further complicating attempts to establish a decentralized system that also was
effective, (p. 355)
Three general areas of need surrounding charter schools were revealed in the
above-mentioned study: developing an instructional/curricular program, developing a
meaningful accountability system, and developing school management/leadership
processes. Although these areas were identified, little was mentioned in terms of specific
solutions or recommendations to avoid or improve upon areas of need. Additionally, the
participants in the focus groups had perspectives that came from their involvement in
large, urban school districts.
Manno and Finn (1998) conducted a two-year research project which found many
unique problems with charter schools that made it through their first year. These
problems included: meager facilities that place stress on the program and frustrate people,
signs of burnout, low first year test scores, and pressure to add more than neighboring
traditional schools. Again, no attempt was made to offer recommendations or suggestions
for how these problems may be solved or minimized. In later research, Finn (2002) adds:
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Schools turn out to be exceedingly complex organizations that must juggle myriad
competing pressures. Starting such an institution from scratch is truly daunting.
The political compromises that nearly every state has made in its charter law
mean that founding a successful charter school entails finding or building a
facility, making do with partial funding, and enduring a lot of red tape. (p.93)
A 2002 review by Manno suggests that charter schools face a list of issues that
impact their ability to function and maintain their operations, including: local opposition,
interest group attacks, and enemies from within. Manno stresses the need for more local
and national charter organizations that allow charter school operators, staff, parents, and
students to network, become more knowledgeable, and advocate for themselves.
A 1998 UCLA charter school study, conducted by principal investigator Amy
Stuart Wells, found that issues surrounding charter schools also included: not being held
accountable for academic achievement, need for private resources in order to survive, and
dependency on strong, well-connected leaders.
Cobb and Suarez (2000) found that issues faced by North Carolina charter schools
also included the need for leaders that had more entrepreneurial and interpersonal skills.
This study additionally cited the need to increase salaries in order to attract more
experienced, credentialed teachers. It is unclear whether or not those involved in the
charter schools would have made the same recommendations as the authors.
Malloy (2000) conducted a case study on a charter high school in North Carolina.
Difficulties included implementing instructional strategies that matched the vision of the
charter. Another secondary charter school was studied by Passe (2000). The author's
conclusion was that in order to overcome extraordinary barriers, charters must be
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exceptional in the following areas: cooperation with their school system, leadership,
resources, teachers, and curriculum. Areas that the author viewed as needing
improvement included: effective and experienced leadership, properly trained teachers
who can effectively teach at-risk students, more innovative instructional strategies that
addressed students' needs, and curriculum appropriate for students' learning abilities.
Again, how charter schools are to approach these issues remains unclear.
Conclusion
The common thread which ties all of the literature together is that the research has
been done within the context of charter schools that currently exist, or existed at the time
of the study. Any failures that are noted in this literature are shortcomings of charter
schools that are still operational. There is a need to examine the implications of charters
that have closed, interview those involved in the closure, and learn from their unfortunate
failure as a way to improve the charter school movement.
With some exceptions, current research has emphasized the effectiveness of
charter schools. Unfortunately, there is a lack of published research that discusses a)
which types of charter schools have closed, and b) what advice those involved desire to
give to others who want to embark on their own charter school journey. There is also a
need to know what skills, experiences, structures, and supports were lacking in charter
schools that were forced to close their doors. A proactive approach needs to be taken in
the development and sustainability of charter schools, not only for the sake of the
students whose families have chosen to enroll their children in charter schools, but also
for the growth of our educational system. As part of his interview with The Plain Dealer
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(Ohio) in March of 2009, President Barack Obama encapsulated the importance of the
existence of accountable charter schools:
We've got to experiment with ways to provide a better education experience for
our kids, and some charters are doing outstanding jobs. So the bottom line is to try
to create innovation within the public school system that can potentially be scaled
up, but also to make sure that we are maintaining very high standards for any
charter school that's created.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Although there have been several efforts to list California charter schools that
have closed, as well as document the officially articulated reasons for their closures
(California Department of Education, 2006; The Center for Educational Reform, 2009;
Manno, Finn, and Vanourek, 2000), there has been little, if any, attempt to find
underlying causes of the closures. A significant amount of knowledge resides in the
administrators and directors of these closed charter schools.
This chapter first summarizes the initial research design which intended to utilize
document analysis, quantitative survey results, and qualitative interviews. Second, the
implementation difficulties with the quantitative surveys are addressed, along with the
need for a shift in the initial research design. Third, a description of the qualitative
procedures that became the primary data source for the two newly designed research
questions are discussed. Fourth, the data analysis procedures for the two new research
questions are outlined. Finally, the delimitations and limitations of the study are
reviewed.
Initial Research Design
Initially, this study attempted to employ both qualitative and quantitative research
methods to query former administrators as to the underlying reasons for their schools'
closures. At the onset of the study, the methods that were scheduled to be used included
document analysis, the distribution of a largely quantitative survey, and qualitative
interviewing.
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Rationale for Participant Selection
Administrators were chosen as the focus of this study over other personnel (such
as teachers and other charter employees), parents, or community members because of the
direct and influential role that charter school administrators/directors held during their
tenure in a charter school. According to a finding in a 1998 UCLA Charter School Study
led by Amy Stuart Wells, charter schools depend on leaders who are powerful and have
influential connections. According to the same study, it is common for charter school
administrators or directors to have been directly involved in the chartering process of
their school, which would provide them with a valuable perspective in understanding the
circumstances surrounding the school's closure. Some of the respondents did assist in
developing their charter schools and writing the charter proposals; others were hired
shortly after the charters had been approved by the sponsoring district or county office of
education.
Additionally, administrators were good candidates for this study because of the
practical need for one point-of-contact for a school that has already been closed and
because the point-of-contact selected should be comparable from site to site. As a former
charter school administrator, I also believe that administrators have the opportunity to
observe a wide range of perspectives at their school sites, including the viewpoints of
parents, teachers, students, and the chartering agency, which makes their knowledge
valuable and diverse.
Administrators of schools labeled as "abandoned," "inactive," or "withdrawn"
were not contacted because these schools (or potential schools): a) were vacated without
formal closure procedures, b) had charters that were approved, but did not secure a
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student population due to an issue such as a lack of facility, or c) had approved charters,
or charters that were in the approval process, but were withdrawn from the process by the
submitter(s). These types of schools were not categorized under the four legal reasons
listed in California Charter School Law, which include: a) violation of the standards set
forth in the school's charter, b) fiscal mismanagement, c) failure to meet outcomes for
student achievement specified in school's charter, or d) violation of any provision of law
(California Education Code Section 47607(c)). Therefore, these three types of categories
for failed charter schools did not fit the criterion established for the study.
Document Analysis
Miller (1997), as cited in Patton (2002), argues that documents are "socially
constructed realities that warrant study in their own right" (p. 498). The analysis of
documents provided information to determine the official, legal reason why the school
was not given charter renewal or was revoked. Written rationale for the closure of the
school provided me with some of the historical and contextual information I needed in
order to proceed with, and attempt to triangulate, the qualitative interviews. Since this
piece of data collection was utilized in order to answer the revised research questions, a
more detailed discussion of document analysis will occur later in the chapter.
Locating Survey Participants
I initially attempted to contact the entire population of approximately one hundred
thirty-nine former California charter school administrators/directors (through the
2004/2005 school year) via email to complete a twenty question survey (See Appendix
B) regarding their experiences with a charter school closure or revocation. For the
purposes of this study, administrators were those that held the title of "director,"
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"principal," or other title that signaled that they were the formal leader of the school.
Since there is some discrepancy among available lists of closed and revoked charters, my
primary source for locating administrators was through the list generated by the
California Department of Education (CDE) Web site.
Survey Design
A survey was initially used to gather a portion of the data for this study. A twenty
question self-administered survey was developed that generated ideas regarding the
relationships that charter administrators had with their personnel and their chartering
agency, as well as information regarding their preparedness, or lack thereof, for leading a
charter school. An online survey program (Survey Monkey) was utilized in order to allow
easy access and clear design for those participating in this research study.
Qualitative Interview Design
The study moved from a mixed-methodology structure to an almost exclusively
qualitative one (the limited survey data that I was able to gather were used to identify
interviewees and also to help triangulate interview data); therefore, the primary method
of data collection became qualitative interviews. The qualitative interview design that
was used merits its own section, and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Implementation Processes and Difficulties
Unfortunately, I was unable to fully execute the methods intended to be used in
the initial design of the study. Issues that arose with document analysis are discussed
below, even though I was still able to use outside sources to triangulate some interview
data. This section also outlines the fatal problems that occurred with the quantitative
surveys.
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Document Analysis
Document analysis did provide information regarding documented legal reasons
for charter school closures. A closure list from a 2009 report by The Center for
Educational Reform documents official reasons for some charter school closures. Missing
or more recent closure information was provided by board minutes from the sponsoring
district or county office of education, or closure lists available through the California
Department of Education. Newspaper articles also served to triangulate data. Documents
were located on the Internet, and phone calls and e-mail correspondence (primarily with
county offices of education and school districts) were used to locate additional
information.
There are, however, some discrepancies and inaccuracies in the documents that
list charter school closures which made it difficult to locate consistent information. For
example, two schools that had not been labeled solely as a home school/independent
study program became the focus of qualitative interviews. I was unaware of the nature of
the schools (which were more of a "hybrid" model: partially a home school program and
partially an on-site program) until I conducted the qualitative interviews. Although I
chose to include those two schools because of the valuable information generated through
the interview, the confusion could have been avoided had the charter school closure lists
been more accurate and reliable.
Surveys
Surveys were designed with the intent to collect former charter school
administrators' opinions regarding the closures of the schools, but there were significant
problems with this component of the study's original design.
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An introductory letter accompanied each e-mail request for participation in the
study (See Appendix A). Surveys were sent out multiple times, and many e-mail
addresses were no longer valid. Internet searches were used to try to locate potential
respondents, but the further back a school had closed, the more difficult it became to
locate certain individuals. Contacting districts to locate individuals also proved to be
futile. As district personnel changed, connections to past schools and former
administrators became more removed and often were non-existent.
I was only able to secure responses from fourteen percent of this sample, which
produced ungeneralizable data. The small response rate did not lend itself to any
significant data analysis; therefore, the results of the surveys are not presented within the
framework of this study. There may be mention of survey responses, however, within the
context of each individual qualitative case study if the information is relevant and
enhances the data generated from the qualitative interviews.
Although not enough data were generated through survey responses to fulfill the
initial quantitative portion of this study, the information obtained from the surveys helped
to establish relevant and meaningful background information for the qualitative
interviews. Those surveys that were returned did play a key role in locating and securing
qualitative interview participants.
I attempted to contact twelve of the twenty survey respondents for a qualitative
interview based on their expressed interest in further participation in the study. One
survey respondent expressed interest in being contacted, but did not return phone calls;
another respondent did not return emails; a third gave an inaccurate phone number. In
total, nine interviews were conducted.
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Research Questions
As mentioned in Chapter One, this research study initially contained the following
research questions:
5) Using the Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme (1999) typology, which types of
California charter schools have closed?
6) What are the reasons for the school closure?
a) What was the official legal reason for closure?
b) What reasons do administrators give for the school closing?
7) In retrospect, what, if anything, do the administrators of closed charter schools
believe could have been done (through training, education, or other means) to
prevent the school from closing?
8) What information do the administrators feel would be helpful to those wanting to
open charter schools in the future?
Due to the lack of data generated through the quantitative surveys, this study now focuses
solely on the following research questions:
3) What are the reasons former charter school leaders give for the closure of their
schools?
4) What advice do these former charter school leaders offer to those who are
interested in starting or continuing a charter school?
Qualitative Interview Procedures
Due to the evolution of this study to a purely qualitative research design, the
qualitative interviews have become the cornerstone of the data collection and analysis.
The information gathered from these interviews generated the heartiest and most
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meaningful data, which gave a contextually grounded description of the opinions and
advice of former charter school administrators. The interview data described both former
charter school directors' perceptions of the schools they had attempted to lead, why the
contexts they once led no longer exist, and the lessons they learned and can pass on to
others wishing to start and/or lead a charter school.
The primary method of data collection used in this study was topical interviewing,
which is interviewing that focuses more on a program, issue, or process than on people's
lives (Glesne, 1999). In other words, I was not concerned whether or not the
interviewees' actions or inactions personally contributed to the closure of the schools,
although it is quite possible that the formal leader may have contributed, directly or
indirectly, to the closure. Instead, my interest focused on perceptions about the reasons
regarding why the schools closed, and, more importantly, the interviewees' opinions of
what could have prevented the closures, as well as what advice they had for those
wanting to open charter schools in the future.
Preliminary Study
A preliminary study was conducted to explore why one particular California
charter school was closed and what those involved felt could have been done to prevent
the closure. This study suggested that there was a potential to gather interesting
information about charter schools that have closed. This sort of information would not be
found in simple lists that give us names of schools and the legal reasons for closure.
Two interviews were conducted in my preliminary study to gather information on
a charter school in California that closed in 2003. Since the school had no formal
"principal" as a contact, I interviewed two people: the charter school liaison employed by

40

the local school district, whose responsibility included "keeping track" of the school's
progress, and the business administrator employed by the charter school. Although the
qualitative data from the preliminary study provided interesting results, the type of
participant changed for the purposes of this dissertation study, as described earlier in this
chapter.
The results of the preliminary study suggested that answers to both the knowledge
and opinion questions present in the interview guide could be obtained within a forty-five
to sixty minute time frame. Some interviews that transpired as part of the actual
dissertation study lasted two hours. The preliminary study also suggested that there may
be a distinct difference between the legal reason for one charter school's closure and the
reasons given by administration and other personnel, which seemed to be the
circumstance in many of the case studies profiled in this dissertation study.
Protocol for Qualitative Interviews
Purpose and use of the interview guide. Interviews conducted as part of this
study employed an interview guide. Patton (2002) describes an interview guide as a "list
of questions or issues that are to be explored in the course of an interview. An interview
guide is prepared to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each
person interviewed" (p. 343). By utilizing this method of interviewing, I was able to
discover the causes for the closure of the charter schools while exploring other questions
by using probes that were designed to prompt the interviewee to clarify and explain both
the knowledge and opinions he or she is providing (Patton, 2002).
The interview guide strategy can also be seen in terms of a continuum which
ranges from conversational to structured. Patton (2002) clarifies this point by stating that
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"the interviewer remains free to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to
word questions spontaneously, and to establish a conversational style but with the focus
on a particular subject that has been predetermined" (p. 343). The majority of the
interviews in this study were conversational in nature and required some probing
questions.
Procedures before the interviews. The location and time for the interview was
established by the interviewee and me, with emphasis on convenience for the
interviewee. Interview locations ranged from the interviewee's home, to local coffee
shops, to current work sites, to one phone interview. Once the interviewee was chosen
and verbally agreed to be interviewed, I went over the informed consent form with them
and ask them to sign it (See Appendix C). All agreed and signed the informed consent
form.
Procedures during the interviews. I began by granting each interviewee the
chance to visually represent his or her experiences by completing a timeline. I explained
to each interviewee that he or she could highlight major events that led up to, and
possibly contributed to, the closure of the charter school. None of the interviewees chose
to complete a timeline. Most were eager to tell their story and began sharing information
before any formal questions were asked.
Each interviewee had the opportunity to tell me about his or her experiences with
their charter school (see Appendix D). These initial conversations reflected Spradley's
(1979) "grand tour questions," which give respondents the opportunity to verbally take
the interviewer through a place, a time period, or a sequence of events or activities
(Glesne, 1999). Knowledge questions, as described by Patton (2002), allowed me to
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understand how informed the interviewees were about their particular charter school
closure, not charter school closures in general. The answers to the opinion questions
assisted me in understanding what the respondents thought about some experience or
issue (Patton, 2002), in particular, the closure of their school.
Interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The one telephone
interview was held on a speaker phone, audio-recorded, and transcribed as well. Field
notes were taken in order to recall physical and environmental occurrences throughout
the interview. As noted by Patton (2002), field notes help to clarify information or devise
new questions, assist in finding quotes in later data analysis, ensure that the interviews
are moving in a desirable direction, and they are useful for back-up in case the tape
recorder fails.
As a token of appreciation and an acknowledgement of the value of the
respondent's time, the nine individuals who participated in the interview process each
received a twenty-five dollar gift card to Barnes and Noble bookstore.
Procedures immediately following the interviews. After each interview, I
"compared the data actually obtained in the interview to the data desired as specified in
the guide in order to begin planning for the next interview" (Patton, 2002, p. 421) by
answering the following questions in my field notes:
Where did the interview occur? Under what conditions? How did the interviewee
react to questions? How well do I think I did asking questions? How was the
rapport? Did I find out what I really wanted to find out in the interview? If not,
what was the problem? (Patton, 2002, p. 384)
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I also personally transcribed each interview as close to the time of the actual interview as
possible.
Triangulation
The qualitative interviews became much more expansive in terms of generating
information than previously intended at the onset of the study. The interviews were
initially intended to be secondary to the quantitative survey results. Because of the
original design of the study, there was no plan to triangulate the qualitative data produced
by the former administrators' interviews with additional qualitative interviews conducted
with additional people familiar with the schools' closures, such as parents, teachers, or
other pertinent individuals associated with the schools. Therefore, there was no withincase triangulation. There was, however, some additional data support collected through
document analysis. The survey responses given by the interviewees prior to the
interviews also allowed for analysis of consistencies, or inconsistencies, between their
survey responses and interview responses. Additionally, there were some interesting
shared themes that developed through cross-case analysis that reflected strong
commonalities across the closures that were documented in this study.
Data Analysis
Analysis of the qualitative data is organized around the two newly developed
research questions.
Research Question One: What Are the Reasons Former Charter School Leaders
Give For the Closure of Their Schools?
As was noted in the discussion of data collection procedures, the legal reasons for
closure were secured through the use of a list compiled in 2009 by the Center for
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Education Reform (CER). This is the primary document in finding official charter school
closure information since the organization is credible and the charter school closure
information is well-organized. The current California Department of Education (CDE)
web site (or direct contact of CDE) served to supplement any missing information from
the CER report.
The interview data were coded based on the interview questions. Interview
transcripts and corresponding field notes were read through and initial coding took place
based on themes that emerged from the data. Subsequent analysis of the data identified an
emergence of themes that occurred consistently, as well as compelling ideas that may
have been established in only one case study. Although the interview data were not
linked to attempt to create cause and effect relationships, I searched for commonalities by
using the same codes and looking for similar themes across all of the interviews.
As mentioned above, instead of trying to find cause and effect relationships
within each interview, I looked for a holistic picture that assisted in understanding a
charter school closure within a specific context (Patton, 2002). The specific context is
reflected in each set of interview data representing a closed charter school.
The findings are presented through nine individual case studies and cross-case
analysis. Each interview was coded based on the interview questions and themes that
emerge through the interpretation and analysis of the interview responses. The
interviewees' responses are integrated into matrices that allow the comparison of answers
for each of the interview questions. My hope is that I have developed a clearer, holistic
picture of why some charter schools in California have closed, while understanding the
essential nature of a particular set of charter schools in a specific context (Patton, 2002).
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Research Question Two: What Advice Do These Former Charter School Leaders
Offer to Those Who Are Interested in Starting or Continuing a Charter School?
The second research question was addressed through qualitative conversational
interviews with questions outlined in the interview guide (See Appendix C). Although
opinion items were present in the survey, and inquired as to whether or not respondents
felt they had opinions and/or advice to share, richer and more meaningful data for these
specific interview questions were obtained through the qualitative interview process. As
noted earlier in this chapter, similarities and differences among administrators' responses
were analyzed using initial coding of each interview and the uncovering of the
development of themes in the data. After several readings of the interview data, formal
themes emerged both within each interview and among the interviews. The techniques of
description (staying close to data as originally recorded) and analysis (identifying key
factors in the study and relationships among them) were implemented (Glesne, 1999).
Therefore, the interviews were compared for commonalities and differences, and each
administrator's opinions and advice were shared in both narrative format and through the
cross-case analysis matrices format described above.
Delimitations of the Study
As stated previously, this study did not include charter schools labeled as
"withdrawn," "abandoned," or "inactive" by the California Department of Education.
This is due to the fact that these schools were not closed for the three legal reasons for
closure or revocation as stated in the California Charter School Law, and this study
specifically targets schools that have been closed or revoked after charter status had been
granted.
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This study also did not include those charter schools that were labeled as "home
school/independent study", although two schools were miscategorized within closure
documents, and I did not clearly understand their hybrid nature until the qualitative
interviews occurred. The purpose of this research was to focus on charter schools that
were more traditional in nature; meaning, schools that looked, from the outside and
within their structure, more like traditional public schools. That said, the interviews of the
administrators of the "hybrid" schools did offer valuable information.
Limitations of the Study
One obvious limitation to this study that has already been discussed at length was
the flaws and failure of the quantitative survey design. There simply was not enough
reliable information available to successfully contact former charter school leaders
regarding their experiences with the closure of their charter school. Although I did
receive twenty responses to the surveys, that was not enough to warrant separate
discussion in this dissertation.
Initially, the research design was primarily based on quantitative survey
responses, with a secondary emphasis on the qualitative interviews. The interviews were
initially intended to triangulate the survey data, along with document analysis. Since the
response rate was so low and the quantitative data were not valid, I made a good-faith
attempt at triangulating the interview data with as many outside resources as possible,
although I was not able to conduct any additional interviews for each case study.
This study was limited to administrators of California charter schools that have
closed or have been revoked. Valuable information could also be obtained by
interviewing or accessing information from teachers, parents, students, charter sponsors,
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and others involved with the closure of a charter school. Additionally, because of the
unique demographics, geographic location, and infrastructure of California, beneficial
information could be gathered by studying charter school closures and revocations in
other states.
There are schools other than charter schools that have been forced to close. Public
schools are closed for various reasons, and under No Child Left Behind, it is certain that
more schools will close or convert to charter school status in the future. Private schools
are also sometimes forced to close their doors. This study clearly limited itself to the area
of closed and revoked charter schools. Other schools that have closed may also have their
own distinct stories to tell.
Self-report bias may have occurred when interviewing former charter school
leaders. Given that there is evidence to suggest that the principal (or person in a similar
position) is one of the most influential forces in a charter school, the
principals/administrators that participated in this study quite possibly did not fully or
accurately report their roles—which could have been significant—in the closure of their
own charter school. In fact, the participants may not have fully understood themselves the
impact they may have had on their school's closure.
Finally, researcher bias was identified as a potential issue that might impact the
study. Since I have only worked in successful charter schools, both as a teacher and
administrator, I had to put aside my opinions and experiences so that I could learn the
important lessons shared by those who have worked in unsuccessful charter schools.
The following chapter includes nine case studies which were developed after nine
separate qualitative interviews.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the study's findings that were generated
through qualitative interviews triangulated with data from relevant document analysis and
the interviewees' responses to the survey questions. For reasons explained in the previous
chapter, the qualitative interview data turned out to be most significant in this study.
Hence, the data from each qualitative interview are presented in individual case study
format. The interview data are presented in randomly-selected order. All of the data are
then used in the following chapter as part of a cross-case analysis organized around the
study's research questions.
The Case Studies
Case Study One: "I Was the Charter School"
Sitting in an independent, local coffee shop outside of a major California city, I
found myself scanning the faces wondering who I would be interviewing. It was a few
minutes past our meeting time, and I wore a name badge so that I could be easily
identified. Finally the interviewee's eyes caught my name and we approached each other.
After ordering coffee and finding a suitable spot, I asked the interviewee, "Do you want
to draw out a timeline of your involvement with the charter school?" The interviewee
answered very matter-of-factly, "I was the charter school."
As she had indicated in her responses to the online survey, this interviewee had
been a school administrator for less than three years prior to directing the charter school.
The interviewee also stated that she possessed a teaching credential, an administrative
credential, and a doctoral degree.
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The beginning. This charter school, which interview and survey response data
suggest should be classified as a Type A charter school (urban/ethnocentric/grassroots)
using the typology of charter school categories described in Chapter Two, started out as a
result of the denial of a petition to a large urban district to be a "new small autonomous
school" (a classification for schools within the district that were granted more freedom to
be self-regulated within the district than their district counterpart schools were typically
granted.). After the petition was denied, a school board member suggested that the
petitioner (the interviewee) look into becoming a charter school. The interviewee
attended a charter school workshop and, although the information presented at the
workshop seemed overwhelming, the interviewee was convinced that the charter option
represented the best strategy for establishing the school she envisioned.
This school started out with an emphasis in constructivism (allowing students'
own problems and questions to guide instruction, building on students' strengths and
interests) and dual immersion. Dual immersion is a bilingual program that essentially
combines native and non-native speakers of two languages to teach both languages
simultaneously through academic content and social interaction; the goal is to help
students to develop fluency in two languages, their first language and a second language.
The initial concept also included having half Latino and half African-American students
so that the two cultural groups could learn from each other. According to the petitioner,
"We cared about everything. We cared about what food they ate, what snacks they
brought, where we got our lunches. We really wanted the place to be as beautiful as
possible and that cost us a lot of money."
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The interviewee mentioned that the first version of the charter, which was initially
for the autonomous small school concept, was "awful and got rejected for very good
reasons." The petition was rewritten primarily by the interviewee for consideration for
charter school status, and was approved in the spring of 2001. The school opened in the
fall of 2002 with 65 students.
At the end of the first year of operation, test scores were very low (according to
what the interviewee was told, the lowest in the district); the school had an Academic
Performance Index, or API (a numeric index ranging from 200-1000 that indicates the
academic performance of a school) of 464 in 2004 with fifty students tested. By 2006, the
school had an API of 540 with one hundred three students tested (California Department
of Education charter school database). The interviewee had been "fighting the tests for
decades and just did not want that to be the focus of the school." Even the interviewee
admitted that the decision to, in essence, ignore test until they had to be given —to fail to
do any preparation to take them or be sure the school's curricular content was aligned
with test content— might have been a bit too idealistic.
The downfall. The interviewee admitted that the school was not doing as much
bilingual education or constructivism as promised, and as stated earlier, student test
scores were low. The interviewee said, "They [district officials] don't care about
constructivism. They don't care about bilingual education, so they were phony-baloneys.
The test scores they did care about."
During the school's years of operation, the interviewee was very critical of the
local school district superintendent, both privately and through interviews she granted to
local newspapers. This interviewee believed the school's charter was revoked after four
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years due to her negative relationship with the district's superintendent and her outspoken
criticism of the sponsoring district. The interviewee stated that the superintendent used
the school's low test scores as an opportunity to "take revenge."
The storyline about the reasons for the school's closing that the interviewee
outlined during the interview was consistent with her response to the open-ended survey
question: "Please list any reasons other than those offered above as possible contributing
factors to your charter school's closure." The interviewee's response to this survey
question was as follows:
We were closed because I was an outspoken critic of the district administrator.
The excuse was low test scores, which went up our last year because we did all
the cynical things (no teaching, just test prep, opted out our most confused kids,
etc.). It is a tragedy for the neighborhood, because we stabilized our corner of the
worst part of [our city]. Now it's an empty lot again.
According to the sponsoring school district's Board of Education minutes
dated March 2006, the charter was revoked "given the lack of progress made by the
school i.e., the test scores are sixty points below any other school in this district. It is not
clear which of the standards are being taught through the project based learning process."
The motion was made, seconded, and carried by three board members. (Two of the five
board members were absent). The Center for Education Reform (2009) also cites
"academic" as the reason for closure, with the following explanation: "some of the lowest
test scores in the district and students were not making adequate academic progress."
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The former director spent the spring of 2006 attempting to appeal the revocation.
The interviewee also attempted to find another sponsor to take over the school, but no
organization wanted to take on the work of accepting this charter school.
What could have been done differently. An obvious variance that might have
led to a different outcome would have been improved test scores, though the director
made it clear to me that the school did not want to emphasize test preparation in day-today programming. The director also thought that the school could have used more staff
that were bilingual, culturally diverse, and trained in constructivist education. In addition,
the director believed that, if given the opportunity to make a case for the school in front
of the school board, the school would have "won" and the school's charter would not
have been revoked. The director believed that the decision to revoke the charter was
made independent of the board and was done at the sole discretion of the superintendent.
The board members who voted to close the school, from the interviewee's perspective,
simply rubber-stamped the superintendent's decision. (Whether or not this analysis of
board involvement is correct is another question entirely, one that this study, given its
research design, could not answer).
To encourage the interviewee to elaborate on her response, I asked, "What would
you have said to them [the school board]?" The interviewee's response was as follows:
We were doing things that had never been done before. We were giving poor kids
of color a kind of prep school education. The kind of education that the kids in the
hills get and within a couple of years our test scores would have probably gone
up.
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To the extent that the interviewee's analysis of what prompted the school's
closing—i.e., that low test scores were simply the public reason given for the real
reason—was at least somewhat correct, the beginning of the end probably came when the
director accused the superintendent of sitting on one hundred eighty thousand dollars in
state grant money intended for the charter school. In the spring of 2003, the director was
told at a meeting that the money would not be available for another week, so the director
went downstairs to the superintendent's office to ask for the money. The director was told
by the superintendent's "body guard" (the interviewee's characterization) that he was not
available and would not be willing to discuss the issue anytime in the near future. A few
days later, the director received a letter from the superintendent's office stating that the
director would not be allowed back in the building for a month.
The director then went to the local newspaper which wrote a story from the
director's perspective, and that story, in the interviewee's account, at least, is what sealed
the fate of this charter school. This article (source removed for confidentiality) supported
the claim that the director was banned from school district headquarters (for 30 days)
after arguing with the former bodyguard for the superintendent. Also, the article stated
that this was the first time in this particular district's history that a charter school had
been revoked due to academic reasons.
Advice for others. This director's first piece of advice was to start with a lot of
money. ("A million's about right.") The director indicated that a hefty budget was needed
"to do whatever it takes to get very poor kids who start out five years behind to catch up
with [other] kids."
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Additionally, the director felt that a charter needs to have a longer day, a longer
year, and better student-to-teacher ratios. The director also alluded to creating a sort of
school culture by retaining good teachers who know the students and stay at the school
year after year. Another piece of advice was not to allow business people to run charters,
but to use them as support. The director recommended "hooking up with or hiring a
business person or a business firm." A director should not try to do the business piece
alone, according to this interviewee.
Since the closure of this charter school, the director has had the opportunity to
visit other charter schools. The director's opinion of successful charter schools is that
"they have way more money and they're selective in their population. One way or
another, legal or not, they have to be."
One of the director's final statements was the following:
If I ever did it again, I would do it under somebody else's umbrella, and I would
want serious political protection. Serious. As I said, if only we had not been under
[the superintendent's] umbrella, I could have persuaded the board [to keep the
charter].
Case Study Two: "It Was a Dream Come True With a Nightmare Behind My Head"
I encouraged each interviewee to choose the location of his or her interview;
often, the locations selected seemed to reflect the personality of the interviewees. For the
second interview being reported here, I met the interviewee at a local restaurant and bar,
with somewhat loud country music playing and peanut shells on the floor. The interview,
therefore, was very relaxed and casual, and the interviewee seemed eager to share the
charter school closure experience.

55

During the interview, this interviewee confirmed what she had reported on the
online survey: she had no experience as an administrator prior to her involvement in the
charter school, possessed a doctoral degree and an educational administrative degree, but
did not hold a teaching or an administrative credential.
The beginning. This particular charter story began in the 1999/2000 school year.
This school wanted to be free of district regulations and fiscal constraints in order to
implement a specific vision of education. Because of this emphasis on the personal vision
of the director, this school could probably best be classified as a Type C charter school
(using the typology discussed in Chapter Two, i.e., a charter school that was founded by a
charismatic leader.)
This charter was submitted for approval by the district in 2000. After receiving
the initial state planning grant, the director and team of initial petitioners went to
Washington, D.C. for a national charter school meeting. After that meeting, the
petitioners were informed by their sponsoring agent (the local school district) that one of
the requirements necessary for successful approval of their petition was to acquire 350
signatures from parents of potential students. They turned in 600 signatures. The district,
as the potential sponsoring agent for this charter school, rejected this first group of
signatures. The district felt that too many of the signatures came from people outside of
the boundaries of the neighborhood in which the school was to operate. The petitioners
and director then submitted a new batch of signatures which was accepted by the district.
The second part of the authorization process, according to this interviewee, was to
obtain budget approval. Several proposed budgets were rejected, and the interviewee
finally asked the district to create a budget for the charter that district officials would find
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acceptable. The district complied. This whole approval process took two years, and
during this time, the petitioners were becoming impatient and felt ignored. The
interviewee also saw the delay as part of a larger pattern:
One board member tried to limit the petition to three years. All of the people
coming forward, all of the land that we had acquired, people were told that we
were not going to receive our petition, and they garnered property that we were
supposed to have. It was quite interesting.
Additionally, the director stated, "We found out from the lenders that we were
seeking that [the district] was telling them not to invest with us [the charter school]
because [the district] was going to take the petition [off the table]." In other words, the
district was giving the school's potential lenders the impression that the charter school
would never be a secure investment because it would never actually open and,
consequently never, generate any income to repay the loans. In essence, the director felt
they were being set up for failure before the charter petition was ever even approved.
Eventually, the charter petition was approved in 2002. The charter school did not
actually have a physical space for operation until 2004, which the interviewee attributed
to obstruction by the district as discussed above. According to the California Department
of Education charter school database, the school was given a charter number by the State
Board of Education in September of 2003, with an official school start date of August
2005. This former director also indicated that the behaviors described above were not
accidental. Indeed, she felt there was intentional collusion and undermining, particularly
at the district level.

For example, when the director was in the hospital, her secretary

called her to let her know a key was available for "the new building". The director and
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charter school board members involved in attempting to open the charter school never
signed a contract for a new building; therefore, the director assumed someone at the
district level forged one of the charter school board member's signatures in order to
create a situation where, to the naked eye, the charter school had secured a physical space
but no one was moving forward with the process of actually opening the school.
The driving force for opening the charter from the district's perspective,
according to this director, was the money that would come from an operational fee that
the district would charge the charter school each year. Once the charter school board
members and director were given the key to a building that supposedly this charter
school's board members did not approve, the charter school was forced to open its doors
unprepared and had to begin with only ten students. Within a few weeks there were 40
students, mostly recruited through word of mouth in the community.
This former charter school director felt the school continued to experience district
interference even after the charter was approved. This time the director felt her family
members, some of whom were involved in the charter school, were being harassed by the
district:
[The district] went after my younger brother who was a three-time soldier of the
year over one of the largest military bases in the U.S. They started running for
[harassing] him. They started running for [harassing] my sister, a pastor and a
long reputation in [the district]. She was very instrumental in getting tennis courts,
a playground, all of these things. She didn't even have any children. She had long
established relationships with [the district] and could not understand why there
was such hostility. Finally [we] realized it's not about hostility, it's about money.
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When you're taking that kind of money out of a district, there's bound to be some
whiplash behind it.
Another example of district interference, according to the director, would be
abrupt turnover of staff. "We'd hire a teacher and a week later she'd be offered a position
in...[a school within the same district]. Okay? That's very interesting." The director felt
that an offer like this was arranged by the district because of the hostile relationship that
had developed between the charter school and the district.
The closure. The director felt that the district was only concerned with
maintaining the income flow that was associated with the administrative fees the district
charged to charter schools. These funds helped support the salaries of high-level district
employees. These administrative fees and the resulting "loss of revenue" for the charter
school, from the director's perspective, was one of the factors that contributed to the
charter school's lack of success.
Eventually, however, the district took action to close its supposed "cash cow."
According to the director, the district called a "special" meeting in order to revoke the
charter and did not want the public there. The director characterized the meeting as
follows:
It was a tedious meeting. I never heard so much undermining before. I really saw
then that charter schools are confronted with a whole host of problems. And the
problems... you can't get a district to understand the loss of revenue, and revenue
is so important because they [school districts] are so top-heavy [i.e., had a large,
well-paid central office staff] you know? And they don't want to let go of that top.
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According to the interviewee, the district supposedly did not want the meeting audio or
video taped; however, the minutes were available on the Board of Education website and
were reviewed as part of this study. The documents suggest that, officially, the reason
that the district revoked the charter was due to "incomplete curriculum, an unbalanced
budget, and an absence of a secured facility" (District Board of Education Special Board
Meeting, December 2005). The motion to revoke the charter was passed unanimously.
The interviewee's explanations for the closure are similar to her response
regarding the school's closure in her open-ended survey response: "Forged documents,
district and city council interference. [The intent of the district was that] we were never
supposed to open, just be granted the charter." (Although the city council was referenced
in the director's survey response, the city council was not mentioned in the interview. I
was unable to acquire information from the interviewee to elaborate on that aspect of her
survey response.)
Later, the director and other petitioners appeared before the state board for an
appeal but were denied. The director felt that, if the state would have stepped in and
enforced "charter school laws" (the interviewee did not specify which ones) properly,
there would have been a chance that the charter school could have stayed open. Also, the
director believed that the school should not have been held to the Memorandum of
Understanding (a type of business agreement arranged by the sponsoring agency and the
charter school, which outlines fees to be paid from the charter school to the district as
well as expectations for both parties in terms of liability, insurance, etc.) that was
developed with the district as a part of the district's agreement to sponsor the charter
school, but should have been held accountable to the actual charter petition, and nothing
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more. All charter schools have Memorandums of Understanding with their sponsoring
agencies and are required to fulfill the responsibilities outlined in the agreement:
responsibilities that typically include such things as remaining fiscally solvent and being
responsible for student achievement.
The advice. According to this interviewee, the first piece of advice to those who
want to begin or maintain a charter is to be vigilant. In other words, "If you are very
passionate about [the charter] and you know that it's right, don't let these districts get
away with anything."
A second piece of advice was: have good legal council and make sure all
documents are signed. Request a response from the district each time a document is
submitted and require signatures on all documents and correspondence. The interviewee
did not specify "good legal council" as a specific problem within the context of the rest of
the interview until she was asked to offer her advice, but she had alluded to issues such as
lack of trust and collusion that may have led to her offering this second piece of advice.
Third, the relationship with the person in the oversight position for charter schools
at the district level (sometimes referred to as the charter school liaison) is a key
participant in insuring a charter school's success, no matter what the school's relationship
is with the district in general. Interestingly, this interviewee did not mention the district's
charter school liaison in her retrospective comments.
If I were someone in the process of writing a charter petition and seeking
approval, what would this director say to me? This director gave the following
advice: I'd say, Sweetie, how much money do you have? How much time do you
have? Are you really prepared for a fight? Are you in it for the money, or the

61

students? Which one? Are you self-sufficient or are you dependent? If you're selfsufficient, you got a chance. If you're dependent, you ain't got a chance in heck,
'cause they're gonna try and wipe you out blind. Legal councils, accountants,
they'll tie you up. So, I'd say watch out for legal and accounting. Curriculum you
can buy anywhere. You can buy it all day long. Buy it first. Your first dollars, buy
your curriculum.
Case Study Three: "Everything About It Screamed Run From This As Fast As You
Can"
This is the one and only interview that was conducted over the phone. I was able
to secure a private office and digitally record the interview over speaker phone. This
interviewee spent a few minutes asking me some questions regarding my study, including
how many interviews I had done, how I chose the interviewees, and whether or not I had
a difficult time tracking people down. This interviewee also asked a bit about my doctoral
program and wanted to be reassured that the interview would remain confidential so that
she would not be anxious about sharing the information about her charter school's
closure. After this preliminary conversation, the interviewee indicated that she was
comfortable with the protocol and procedures, and we proceeded with the interview.
During our telephone conversation, the interviewee corroborated some basic
information that she had reported on the online survey. For example, based on her
description of the charter school during the interview, which was nearly identical to her
description of the charter in the survey she had filled out prior to the interview, the
charter almost certainly was a Category F charter school, i.e., an entrepreneur-initiated
charter school. In addition, this interviewee indicated, once again, that she was an
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administrator for less than one year prior to directing the charter school. The interviewee
completed some graduate school, and had both a teaching credential and an educational
administrative credential. She also stated that she was the director of two charter schools
at the same time, one Kindergarten through eighth grade (the focus of the interview) and
one ninth through twelfth grade.
This is one of two schools in this study that was initially mis-categorized as
"traditional" on the CDE charter school data base, when in fact it was a hybrid of
independent study and site-based learning. Since this was another charter school
contained in this study that was associated with a for-profit business, I chose to include
this case study within the dissertation.
The beginning. This K-8 charter school was numbered by the State Board of
Education in December of 1999, with an official start date of January 2000; although the
interviewee claimed that a marketing campaign for student recruitment began as early as
1997. This school was affiliated with one of the first major for-profit corporations to
identify the niche of the home schooling market. According to the former director:
[The for-profit corporation] identified that they could make a lot of money on the
home schooling market and, generally, they were not educators. They started a
school. At that time, you could start a school as a non-profit [501(c)(3)]. You
didn't have to be chartered through a district.
Documentation from The Center for Education Reform, however, cites an elementary
school district as the authorizer of the charter school. It seems that the for-profit
corporation was a business partner that had its charter petition authorized with the school
district.

63
This director joined the organization in 1999, after issues with the organization's
management of charters arose within the state legislature and elsewhere. There had been
various lawsuits over the corporation's oversight that resulted in legislation and changes
in the law. According to the director, some of the current charter school laws in the state
are a direct result of the problems generated by the corporation associated with this
charter school closure.
This corporation created what the interviewee called "sweetheart deals" with
schools and districts all over California. The interviewee asserted that the corporation
collected approximately 22% of this school's Average Daily Attendance (ADA) monies
as overhead fees. She also maintained that the district had a Memorandum of
Understanding with the corporation to collect seven percent of the school's revenues. In
other words, the school allocated 29% of its budget for the corporation and district
combined.
The former director also mentioned that the corporation attempted to create the
appearance of a local, grassroots type of charter school and marketed each school as such.
The corporation looked for people to run each school site locally. Formerly, each school
had been run from a central location. Each site had a local lead teacher, but that person
did not have any accountability, they were more or less an "administrative functionary."
This interviewee was hired as the "school director" without a lot of power. This
interviewee summarizes her role as follows:
I think the intent was for me to run, what do you call it, interference between [the
corporation] and the teacher groups and the districts and all that. I was expected to
play nice and go along with the goals of [the corporation] and there were big
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bonuses, you know? They signed me on at 55,000 dollars [annually] and they
waived 20,000 in my face for doing a good job, which I should have been making
anyway just as the whole salary (laughter)."
The corporate oversight for this charter consisted of a monthly collection of
teacher-signed attendance verification papers and students' work samples. According to
the interviewee, the corporation did not oversee the day-to-day work of the charter or
provide an accounting of expenditures for materials that were purchased with the budgets
they were given. "There were rumors of trips to Hawaii that I heard about," she joked.
The closure. According to the director, the reason the school closed was because
the corporation held the purse strings and handled finances in an unethical manner. The
agreement was that the county would receive the ADA money for this particular charter
school (in what is often called a dependent charter relationship) and the county in turn
would write a check to the corporation. After receiving the money from the county, the
corporation withheld a reserve of one thousand dollars per student; however, the director
and the staff were supposedly unaware of this action and were led to believe that the
school was going bankrupt: that there was no way the school would be able to "make it"
financially.
Once the director became aware that the corporation was withholding reserve
money from the school site, she began to think that the school could probably make it
through the year without going bankrupt. However, the director shared her reservations in
staying at the school:
I could have chosen to try to work it out but I still had an agreement with the
district. The district still wanted seven percent of our ADA. I think I could have
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managed [the corporation] but it felt very yucky. It felt improper. It was ethically
wrong. Everything about it screamed run from this as fast as you can, so I
participated in the willing closure of that school.
The director categorized the reason for the closure as an ethics violation:
If [the corporation] had really been dedicated to students and supporting student
learning and working toward that, we probably could have made it work. If the
district would not have been all about how much money they could get out of
charter schools, we could have negotiated. We could have collaborated.
This former director gave a similar response regarding the charter school's closure in her
open-ended survey response:
The school closed due to 1) conflicts of interest by sponsoring district and
management company (business corporation); 2) ethical violations around
"phony" MOU's that gave away 7% of school revenue to sponsor district; 3)
fiscal mismanagement by contracted management company which took up to 22%
of school revenue.
In October 2001, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 740 (SB 740) to
strengthen the oversight of non-classroom based schools and implement cutbacks in state
funding for schools failing to meet specified spending standards (RAND Corporation,
2005). At a district board meeting held to establish funding for the charter school for the
following school year, it was determined that the school would receive 70% of the
funding they received the previous school year as a direct result of SB 740. According to
RAND Corporation's analysis of the bill, "concerns have arisen that the process may
have resulted in fiscal instability, an inefficient allocation of resources, and a reduction in
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innovation." The charter school closed in 2002, with "financial: inadequate funding"
cited as the official reason for closure as documented by The Center for Education
Reform (2009).
Advice. This director believes that the day-to-day administrator must have a
handle on the budget: "When idealism is in the forefront, you don't have a lot of practical
day-to-day knowledge. That will not be helpful. At the same time, that 100% business
approach is not student-centered, and that won't work either."
The development of a dynamic school community plus the dedication of the
teachers were two items that the interviewee believed were positive attributes of this
particular charter school. According to the interviewee, teachers should really be invested
in students' success. Teachers should also be involved in the operation of the school
knowing what kind of impact their contribution will have. This impact, according to the
interviewee, should manifest itself as follows:
They [the teachers] don't just come to work. They come to work understanding
what it takes for the school to survive and what their role in that is. Whether it is
to ensure that students make it to STAR testing (California's standardized test that
measures students' mastery of the state content standards), or whether it's
efficient budget expenditures on their part when they're looking for new materials
for their students. I think traditional systems leave teachers out too much. They
not only leave them out, but they do not give them credit for the teachers' desire
to know what is happening, and to understand what is happening.
Finally, this director thought that, in general, ethics violations need to be
eliminated at all costs. Any charter school and its sponsoring agency need to work
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together, and not against, one another. Funding needs to be appropriate and delivered
accordingly.
Case Study Four: "When a Person Is Anti-Charter, They're Going To Do Anything
They Can To Close the Charter Schools Down"
This is one of two interviews that occurred at a school site where the interviewee
was currently working. This particular interviewee is now the director of a different
charter school in a low-socioeconomic urban area. This interviewee reported having more
than nine years experience as a school administrator prior to her experience as a charter
school director. She held a doctoral degree and teaching credential, but did not currently
hold an educational administrative credential.
The beginning. The interviewee's first charter, which was the topic of our
conversation in her new charter school setting, was a middle school/high school model
that began in a leased church building in September of 2003. Based on the director's
description of the inception of this charter school, this school would most likely be
described as a Type A charter school (i.e., urban/ethnocentric/grassroots), as it seems she
wanted the school to serve a very specific community's needs.
The school began with approximately 91 students in its first year. The stipulation
attached to the charter approval was that there would be a second school site by the end
of the second year of operation. By the start of the 2004/2005 school year, the student
population grew to over 400.
The interviewee, who was a university professor at the time the charter school
began, started the charter school for the following reasons:
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I just wanted to get closer to the community. I had been in the university for a
long time and I knew that our community has some very, very, very special needs,
and I just felt that I was distanced from them, and I needed to work with my
people is really what it amounted to. I was an elementary school teacher and then
I had my own private school for seven years. Then I went back to the university,
but there was always a longing to have my school again, and this time, because of
the expense and all the money you have to pour into it, it was like the best of both
worlds to have like a private school with the state funding.
This former director believes the major success of this charter school—a school
that closed after only 13 months of operation—was the parent/teacher commitment. The
teachers were dedicated to the vision, which was to provide a high quality, private-school
type of education to low socioeconomic youth. The parents were committed to the
philosophy of the principal and staff, which was, "If education works, it works for all."
Parents and community members would volunteer in the charter school's after-school
specialty programs such as sewing, cooking, and drama, and would work on the parent
council in order to support school fundraising efforts.
The closure. The problem, according to the interviewee, was that the state
funding for the school was based on the ADA from the previous year. With an ADA
based on 91 students, and a school that had over 400 students, the funding to operate on a
day-to-day basis was far from adequate. The interviewee approached the county office
(the charter's sponsoring agent) with the dilemma and received the following response,
"It's not our problem. We're not a lending institution and we're not a loan institution
either. So, if you cannot sustain yourself, we're going to close you down."
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The interviewee thought the relationship the school had with the county was good
until a new superintendent came on board. Word came down that he was very "anticharter." The director had been told that everything better be kept up at the school site,
because, supposedly, the new superintendent was out to shut charter schools down.
According to County Board of Education Minutes from October 2004, the superintendent
recommended that the Board take action to revoke the charter due to "fiscal insolvency,
fiscal mismanagement, and other material violations of the law and/or charter." The
motion was moved, seconded, and carried, with five board members voting yes and one
board member abstaining. Even though other charters in the county were being forced to
"jump through hoops" (the interviewee's characterization) and were struggling with
renewals, this director felt that the one major reason this charter closed was lack of
financial resources, not fiscal mismanagement as the superintendent had stated during the
board meeting. The Center for Education Reform (2009) cites mismanagement as the
official reason for closure with an explanation of "fiscal insolvency, fiscal
mismanagement, and other material violations of the law and/or charter", which reflects
the reasons given by the superintendent and board members at the board meeting. A
somewhat different but still complimentary explanation of reasons for the school's
closing can be found in the interviewee's open-ended survey response to a question that
asked her to elaborate on the closure of her charter school:
[This charter school] was closed because we 'grew too rapidly' (ADA of 91 in
2003/2004 to 438 in September 2004 and growing). We were deemed fiscally
insolvent because we did not have the finances to sustain the rapid student growth
of paying for 38 staff, two buildings, etc. The funds that we received [were] for
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the 91 ADA for the previous school year rather than for the current number of
students that we had enrolled for the 2004 fall term. These funds could not sustain
us until the current ADA funds kicked in around January of 2005. Therefore, [our
sponsoring agency] revoked our charter and refused to financially support our
school.
The interviewee appealed to the board of directors of the county office of
education to keep the school open. The director reported saying the following to the
county:
I know and you know that you can do this if you wanted to but, whatever the
reason, you do not want to support the school. When we were first approved by
you, it was the best charter [proposal] you had ever read. That's what you said.
And now you're gonna close me down?
The interviewee eventually came to the conclusion that "when a [superintendent] is anticharter they're going to do anything they can to close the charter schools down";
however, in her own admission, the director stated that she knew that "we [the charter
school] did not have the funds [to be fiscally solvent]."
Advice. This director's first piece of advice is: in order to start a charter school,
one needs a large amount of money. The director also stated that the key to a charter
school's success is the teachers, but she quickly added a caveat: "I think one of the
downfalls, the disadvantages of charters is that they pay teachers less. We require more
so we should pay them more." (Note: This statement may not apply to district-sponsored
charters that often are required to use the district's pay scale for teachers.) The director
continued to emphasize the importance of teachers by stating the following: "To me, the
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greatest investment is to have your teachers on board and creative, excited about
educating students and if you have that combination, the school can only go up." The
interviewee added that, in hiring teachers, one needs to ask the right interview questions
to insure that the teachers are really committed.
Case Study Five: "I Really Feel Like Doors Are Opened and Closed For Me Along
the Way, and I Never Had Anything Slammed Shut So Hard"
My fifth interviewee, according to her survey response, had more than nine years
of experience as a school administrator prior to her time as director of a charter school.
She also held a master's degree, a teaching credential, and an educational administrative
credential. My interview with her occurred in a small coffee shop in a beach community
on a Sunday afternoon. The interviewee seemed a bit nervous, but once we were able to
establish some mutual connection with a local university, the interviewee became more
relaxed. As in a number of other interviews, the interviewee became passionate and more
willing to share information once we began to move deeper into the story of the charter
school she had once directed and which was now closed.
The beginning. This charter school, which qualitative data suggest could be a
Type C charter school, or a charter founded by a charismatic educational leader, began in
a very rural agricultural area on a ranch. The school initially was a hybrid home school;
meaning, students were home schooled four days a week, but met at a site with a teacher
one day a week. The owner of the ranch offered the ranch for student use once a week.
The idea for using the ranch as a fully functioning school site stemmed from the 4H and
science activities students were able to engage in while on the ranch site. However, this
particular ranch ended up not being available for full-time school facilities. Fortunately,
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there was a ranch across the street that was used as a home for boys. This ranch had an
unused 30-acre farm. Then the home for boys "had a change in management" and the
new manager, according to the interviewee "turned [out] to be a very visionary-type
person, and we started working together on a plan that would put a charter school on the
farm."
In 2003, the school received $305,000 in charter school start-up grant money from
the state; simultaneously, the boys' ranch began experiencing personnel problems. The
state came in and closed the home for boys down, along with the rest of the ranch. Now,
the interviewee had $305,000, no school site, and a sponsoring district's school board that
was questioning her judgment. The interviewee hired a lawyer to draw up the final
charter petition paperwork, which was approved by the local school district.
The interviewee decided to invest some of this start-up money in a grant writer in
order to secure funds for the charter school she and the manager of the boys' ranch had
begun to envision. The interviewee had attempted grant writing before for specific
programs for the hybrid home school, with no success, so she felt it was necessary to
enlist the help of a professional in order to increase the chances of receiving additional
charter school funding.
Because the interviewee still utilized the ranch as a site for students who were
home-schooled to meet with a certified teacher and gain experience working on a ranch,
the board of the charter school suggested that the school should share another district site
that housed other home school students only a few days a week. This is what the
interviewee decided to do.
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According to the interviewee, the district superintendent was supportive of the
new charter school but did not want any student recruitment to take place due to
dwindling numbers in the district. The interviewee recalled the district's position and the
charter school's response as follows:
We were all in this big, huge financial crisis. It would have been a real problem
for me to advertise in that community, so what I did with the grant money is I
advertised on the radio, in the newspapers, knowing full well that most of the
local people don't read the local papers or listen to that radio station [therefore,
the charter school would not be in competition with the sponsor school district for
pupils]. So we tried to get people from all over the county. So we ended up
getting thirty students and we opened on our campus that fall.
The school then opened on a shared school site with access to one classroom and
service of one teacher hired by the charter school director. The following school year, the
school tried to have kindergarten through eighth grade with two classrooms and two
teachers, with students separated by gender. The director had done some research in
gender-segregated education and felt strongly that this model would benefit the charter
school's student population. By the end of the first semester of the second year of
operation, however, things began to go downhill.
Moving toward closure. Although, according to the interviewee, there was "a lot
of good stuff happening in the fall," previous advice that she had been given was
suddenly beginning to make sense to her. When opening the school, the interviewee had
been told not to start with less than 200 students. The interviewee stated that she believed
this advice might have been linked to parental involvement. "The gossip lines get fired up
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really quick, and if you have any body like that in your school [i. e. a gossip], there's
going to be trouble." Parents began to doubt the aptitude of the teachers and the ability of
the director, and some parents began to communicate their feelings more forcefully to
other parents within the school. The combination of former home school students as well
as students placed in the charter school because they were having academic and
behavioral problems at previous schools seemed to have contributed to internal chaos
which led to the school's closure. One of the school's two teachers quit because there
were students at "a lot of different levels." The interviewee added: "We had really low
kids and really high kids, and the two teachers were really going crazy trying to do it all."
Finally, two students left the school, and the director couldn't justify having two
classrooms and two full-time teachers with such low numbers (under twenty students in
each class). So, at the end of the first semester of the second year of operation, the
director "dissolved the school and incorporated it into the [school on the shared site]
which meets on Tuesdays and Thursdays for math and science." The interviewee told the
sponsoring district (which was also the charter school's board of directors) that the school
was voluntarily closing due to low enrollment.
One of the problems the interviewee recognized from the start was inconsistent
support from the district board, which was the sponsor of the charter. The charter was
held up for five months while the board decided whether or not it wanted to accept the
$305,000 in state grant money that the interviewee obtained to start the school. In other
words (i.e. the words of the former director), "everybody sort of ignored the elephant in
the room." According to a charter school closure spreadsheet provided by the Charter
School Division of the California Department of Education, this charter school was
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officially closed in January of 2006 due to low enrollment, which the interviewee cited as
one of a number of actual issues that threatened the continuation of the school.
Another element that could not have been predicted, but that contributed to the
closure of the charter school, was the closure of the original ranch site where the school
would have initially been located. The interviewee shared the emotions felt when the
ranch was closed:
I really feel like doors are opened and closed for me along the way, and I never
had anything slammed shut so hard. The teen ranch had been there for 100 years
and when I decide and this other guy decides to do this, bam! It's shut, and I said,
okay, somebody's trying to tell me something.
The interviewee gave a somewhat more detailed list of reasons for the school's
closing in her response to the open-ended survey item that allowed the sharing of this
information. This was the response:
I worked on the charter plan with a boys' home/foster care facility. We were
going to place the charter on the ranch. The ranch had legal problems and closed
after 100 years (that had nothing to do with the charter). That meant I had to open
on the school site. This meant our students would come from the district. The
district was already losing students. We advertised outside of the district to get
students.
It seemed as if the director had envisioned the school as a part of this ranch, and
that it was difficult for her to separate the physical site of the school with the vision she
had for the charter itself, which was environmental, outdoor education. Since the
interviewee appeared so disheartened by the closure of the boys' ranch, I believe she felt
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the school would have been more successful, and would have remained open, if
everything had worked out with the boys' ranch site.
Advice. The first bit of advice this interviewee offered is to begin with as many
students as possible. She, in fact, argued that low enrollment is "why so many charter
schools want to be in urban areas. You have a lot of kids to draw from. In rural, there is
nobody near us. We're out in the boon docks and the people who come are driving from
[10 or 20 miles away]." The interviewee also added, "If I were doing it over again, it
would take a lot longer and I would have more possible students."
Second, the interviewee said marketing is a factor that needs to be seriously
considered when starting a charter school. She also stated, "You can't screen out
[undesirable] applicants, but you can make it doubly-hard to get in." The interviewee
suggested the completion of a rigorous application process, as well as student and parent
interviews, as requirements for being admitted to the school. "You have to have an
application process that gets the students that need to be there or belong there, the real
determined ones, rather than T don't have anyplace else to go so I'll come to your
school' kind of attitude.'"
Furthermore, parents need to understand how you will serve students with special
needs, including the strengths and limits of what you can provide to students. The
interviewee added one additional piece of advice:
Just from experience, I would never start with a junior high. We're rethinking
how we're doing this right now, and I would make this particular school a K-3 or
a K-6 at the beginning, and I'd have two classrooms at each grade level, one boy
and one girl.
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Case Study Six: "We Basically Gave Up the Charter As Easily As We Got Into It"
This interviewee reported having less than three years experience as a school
administrator prior to directing a charter school. He also had a master's degree, a teaching
credential, and an educational administrative credential. Due to the parental involvement
described by the interviewee, this school would best be described as a Type E, or parentled charter school, based on the typology found in Chapter Two of this study.
This was the second of two interviews that occurred on a school site where the
former charter school administrator currently worked. This interview was conducted in
the administrator's office on a middle school site in a very rural area. The interviewee
was eager and willing to share information, and consciously attempted to eliminate any
potential distractions prior to the start of the interview.
"School of choice" to charter school. The particular district for this school
offered students and parents "schools of choice," which are basically schools that parents
can choose to send their children instead of their closest neighborhood school. These
schools, according to the interviewee, were granted more discretion by the district in
terms of decision-making so they could make choices based on families' needs and input.
The interviewee described the process of the school first becoming a school of choice as
follows:
Our district approached some of the parents that were key in our district that were
raising a lot of issues, doing a lot of different things and said, "How would you
like to start your own school in our district?", and the parents just thought, "Wow!
What a great idea! What a great opportunity." So a steering committee of seven
parents was chosen to draft something. I don't think our school district thought
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that these seven parents would ever get anything off the ground, but they put
together all.. .they wanted to do as a school, brought it back to our school district,
found that there was enough community interest to fly it, and so then they went
about seeking an administrator to kind of be the first employee and help them get
that going. I ended up getting kind of talked into applying for that position. So I
got the job and worked with these parents prior to starting the school. After the
first couple of years we were just a school of choice in the school district.
It was after the second year that the district approached this school of choice,
primarily its parents and administrator, and asked them if they would like to apply for
charter school status. Those who associated with the school had questions about the
advantages and disadvantages of becoming a charter school. The district representatives
explained that becoming charter would be beneficial to the district if and when parents
from other schools within the district came to them asking why this "school of choice"
had programs or materials that were different than other schools in the district. Having
the charter school title, in the school district's opinion, would exempt the district from
having to justify differences between that particular school and the rest.
Interestingly, the administrator and parents made it clear to the district that they
wanted to be a dependent charter school. A dependent charter is closely tied financially to
the district and the employees would still be employed by the district. The school district
would also be their charter sponsor. The interviewee described in more detail why the
school wanted to remain closely associated with the district:
All of us were happy being a part of the [school district] as employees, as
everybody. We were funneling our kids into the one high school in the district and
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so we didn't want to lose that connection. We also didn't want to have to fund all
of our own other positions, to run a business office, to do benefits, to do all that.
So we functioned as a dependent charter. So all of our business stuff was taken
care of. The district still paid for our facilities and did the whole bit. It really just
allowed us to operate as a school of choice without people being able to hassle us.
This school is the only conversion charter school of this interview group. A
conversion charter school is an existing public school that literally converts (staff,
building, students, etc.) to charter school status. The interviewee and a steering
committee of parents wrote the charter petition. Once the petition was written, seventyfive percent of the current staff chose by vote to convert the school to charter school
status. When the petition was approved by the district for the 1997/1998 school year, the
interviewee felt that "there was really nothing we were doing any better, any different.
We didn't receive in a sense any different funding. All of our funding went to the district
and the district then funded us as a school." The interviewee did note, however, that one
benefit that they had as a charter school was the ability to choose any curriculum they
wanted.
The closure. After the first two years of operating as a charter school, the
administrator and parents who were part of the decision making process (referred to as
the "steering committee") decided to give up the charter, as stated by the interviewee, "as
easily as we got into it." The reason for the closure, according to the interviewee, was
because
we said we were done and not because of any problems, just because sheer
operating and budgeting and all that. It became easier to do it as a non-charter

80

school, and what the school district said is that you guys can continue operating
the way you're operating. We'll back you on whatever you say you're doing.
The reason the interviewee gave for closure aligns with his response to the open-ended
survey question: "It simply became easier to operate as a district school of choice, rather
than a charter school." The official reason documented by the California Department of
Education for the closure is listed as "reverted to non-charter status," which is dated
August of 2000.
Now that the school is once again considered a "school of choice", the
interviewee described the school as operating today "in year thirteen about the same way
as [it] did in the first two years without a charter and the years [it was] a charter." The
interviewee shared the belief that the school would have still been a charter had it not
been for some charters in the state taking advantage of the freedom associated with
charters. District administration had told this director that having the school continue as a
charter school would cost them (the district) more money, and the director stated that no
one, including himself, parents, or teachers, fought to keep the school as a charter school.
The director's main concern was curriculum, not how to fund or finance the school. The
director fought to maintain the use of certain curriculum his site was able to utilize while
operating as a charter school. Since the school was allowed to continue to use that
curriculum due to what the director cited as high API scores (the school had an API score
of 804 in 1999 according to the CDE data files), he didn't feel the need to hold on to
charter school status.
Advice. The interviewee's three areas of advice were: (a) possess a solid reason to
start a charter, (b) have energy and enthusiasm, and (c) secure a positive sponsor and/or
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district relationship. The first question the interviewee would want to ask someone
starting a charter is why the charter petition is being written in the first place. Second, it
would be important to "garner the enthusiasm, energy, and support of staff and parents
necessary to pull [a charter school] off." Finally, the interviewee offered this advice, most
likely due to the positive relationship he had with his sponsoring district:
Do your homework on the district that you ask to sponsor your charter because
you've got to have the support of that district because you could be a little bit at
the whim of the district. I mean, they can't just cut you off for no reason at all, but
they can make your life miserable in the meantime.
Case Study Seven: "I Started Out With Great Hopes and Just Came Out
Completely Disillusioned"
This interviewee's only experience as an administrator was at this particular
charter school. The interviewee did not possess an educational administrative credential.
She did have a master's degree and a teaching credential.
This interview took place in the interviewee's home in a very rural area of central
California. I was welcomed into the interviewee's home on a weekend morning, and we
sat at the kitchen table. Although the interview occurred in the interviewee's
environment, I sensed that the interviewee was nervous about being interviewed. I did,
however, perceive that the interviewee shared information freely as time progressed and
became more comfortable as we discussed her version of the closure story.
Although I initially stated that I would exclude independent study charter schools,
this school was poorly labeled in the California Department of Education documents I
originally analyzed. I did not discover that the school was considered an independent
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study school until the qualitative interview was conducted. The school did, however,
have classes that met once a week. The school site also had a computer lab, staff that
conducted meetings with parents and students, and a special education staff person that
worked with students on a regular basis. Based on those descriptors, this school seemed
to reflect more of a hybrid program than a strict independent study program. Since the
data had been collected and, as it turned out, the school was one of three of my case
studies that were operated by a corporation, I have included this interviewee's story here.
The beginning. This charter school began after the local school district agreed to
sponsor a charter petition that was submitted by a business organization. The school
district was the official sponsor, while the business started and managed the school.
Based on this description and the typology listed in Chapter Two of this study, this school
could be regarded as a Type F, or entrepreneur-initiated, charter school.
The interviewee opened the charter school office facility in the spring of 2000 as
the program director. The interviewee was at the school for a year and a half before it
closed at the end of the 2000/2001 school year. From the start, it seems the interviewee
and the school tried to break away from the business management who, in the words of
the interviewee, "owned us because they started up the school, and we were trying to get
away from them and be sponsored by the county office [of education]." The business had
control over the budget and money, and the site-based personnel had control over
personnel and curriculum.
Initially, the interviewee felt that there was no accountability for student
achievement: "When I took over, the school was not run based on California state
standards or anything. People were doing what they wanted to do, and that was my goal
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to make it more educationally sound." Teacher accountability was also an issue. The
interviewee said that the school had to change some policies in order to ensure the
following:
You had to have a credential to be one of our teachers, and we aligned pay to that.
Pay was assigned originally to how many students you had. You got paid per
student, and so some teachers had 40, 50 students, and how do you manage that
many students and manage them well?
The interviewee was "not pleased with [the business entity] because they were
taking a million dollars a year in [the school's] state funding for their operating
expenses." The interviewee knew that similar schools were giving a certain percentage to
their business partners in exchange for specific services, but not the large amount that this
particular charter school was paying back to its business sponsor. The interviewee
described the amount of money given to the business sponsor as "excessive"; she stated:
"I was questioning a lot of things. They basically told me that I was going to be fired or
[had to] resign because they didn't like what I was leading the school into: getting in with
[another sponsor to negate the business partnership]."
The closure. According to the interviewee, in order to maintain the charter, the
school needed "to get into an educational-based, not a business-based" partnership. The
interviewee attempted to get the county office of education to sponsor the school. As
other alternative sponsors were being sought, the business partner was telling the
interviewee and others at the school that they "were in financial difficulty." The
interviewee stated, "We had to rely on audits and stuff [provided by the business]. It was
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very, very difficult progress and I didn't trust them at all. I did not like them. I did not
trust them the more I got to know them."
Because of the controversy surrounding this particular business partner, which
also partnered with approximately nine other charter schools across the state, the local
school district did not want to be associated with this charter school. In the end, the
business organization and the program director dissolved the school and did not seek
renewal of its charter.
The interviewee mentioned the push toward a new sponsor in her open-ended
survey response as well: "We wanted to be governed by the county rather than the private
group that managed the school. [The private group] were charging too much for too few
services—question of ethical behavior—on their part."
Additionally, a change in leadership at the district level also contributed, in the
eyes of the interviewee, to the downfall of the school:
There was a change in administration in the district half-way through which
changed the whole complexion of the school. The first superintendent was
looking at the charter school as bringing in money to the district and he retired.
Then the second superintendent looked at charter schools as being problems and
not seeing it as a benefit to the district. So the relationship went way downhill
when the administration changed.
The interviewee believed that the bottom line reason why the charter closed had
to do with "misuse of funds". The interviewee described the end of the charter as follows:
I think it was maybe a day late and a dollar short. We participated in the charter
school conventions and all of that and it was a great thing, but we were coming in
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at the end of the movement and that entrepreneurial thing of having a company
running a school, I don't think was a good idea. I think that that was the downfall
of the school as well. It had no close connections to a school district and that was
a bit of an issue because it had no one saying that this is inappropriate; this isn't
how you should do it. They [the business] were trying to get as much money as
they could for themselves and do as little as possible that they could for the
students. Now I, on the other hand, thought that most of the money should go to
the students and not to running the business.
The official reason for closure, which occurred in June of 2002, was "oversight
challenges", as recorded by the California Department of Education. This was reiterated
in a 2009 national charter school closure list compiled by The Center for Education
Reform, which stated mismanagement as the reason for closure, with the following
explanation: "leadership poorly managed school operations." It is unclear who was
considered "leadership."
Advice. The interviewee felt that more accountability would have allowed the
charter school to be more successful. In this interviewee's opinion, there was no
accountability from the business partner back to the school for how money was spent.
The interviewee shared that there was a School Site Council (SSC), "yet we [the SSC]
could make no decisions or anything because there was no knowledge of what our budget
was really. We would ask for a detailed budget and we would never get a detailed
budget."
This interviewee also suggested that a charter school should always have a
"strong tie to a district so that the district would really be a proponent of the school." The
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interviewee then listed specific advice for someone wanting to open or maintain a charter
school:
Number one, you have to know where the money is. The money was the big key
in the running of [our] school because you can't do things without the funding. I
think number two, you have to have solid backing of the district because charter
schools have to be sponsored by the district. You have to have a good relationship
person right there with the superintendent because if the superintendent isn't pro,
it's not going to work. You need to have a goal out there that this is what you
want to achieve with this school. Ours was to meet the needs of the population
that was not fitting into the regular public schools. [The goal] has to be clear[ly]
defined and you have to have a vision of how you're going to meet that. I think
you have to start off with the vision: this is who we want to serve and how are we
going to serve them best.
On a smaller, more day-to-day scale, the interviewee felt that a successful charter
would need to have special education services and support personnel in place. This
school did contract independent services for students who required special education
support, but it was quite a financial burden on the school. Additionally, a charter school
needs a staff that is knowledgeable in standardized test requirements, such as STAR
testing and high school graduation requirements. As mentioned previously, this program
director sensed a disconnect between the district sponsor and the school itself. Often
times mandates and protocol for testing come directly from the district to school sites;
therefore, standardized testing was something this school had to tackle on its own. The
interviewee also believed that a charter school has to have someone who is "very detail-
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oriented": one who can look after records and engage in record-keeping. This would
eliminate the dependence a school such as this one would have on a business partner or
other organization to maintain records and paperwork. The interviewee commented that
"a lot of us in education are global thinkers and we're not into the details of running a
business, and it is a business too so you need to be thinking along that line." Also, a
charter school needs qualified teachers, and the school needs to be able to pay the
teachers the same as any other school in the district so that they want to work for a
charter school without being punished financially. This school seemed able to provide
equal pay after the pay-per-student salary policy was eliminated.
Finally, the interview ended with the interviewee's reflections on the personal
experiences associated with the former charter school:
I think the vision was great when we started. We had such high hopes and it was
so exciting getting it going and stuff and the freedom to be able to do different
things in a different way. It was great. I still think there's possibility out there but
when I hear 'charter' now I cringe, just because I don't know who's got the
control. If it's not the education people, if it's business people, I don't trust them,
and it's just the way I was burnt. I started out with great hopes and just came out
completely disillusioned.
Case Study Eight: "The Dynamics Were More One of Survival and Not One of the
Perfect Place, For Me, Academically"
In this case, a grassroots organization eager to open a school that focused on
education aligned with conservation and animal protection was granted approval for a
charter school by a school district. This school was given a charter number by the State
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Board of Education in January of 2004, as documented by the California Department of
Education. Because of the very specific vision of the school's charter, this school could
be classified as a Type A charter school (urban/ethnocentric/grassroots).
The interviewee, who at the time was the director of another existing charter
school, offered to oversee this charter since the founding organization did not want
anything to do with the managerial aspect of the school. The director also had experience
both as a classroom teacher and as a manager in a large package delivery business. He
also held an administrative credential, a teaching credential, and an M.B.A. Prior to
working with this charter school, he had six years of experience as a school administrator.
The beginning. The charter school did not physically open as soon as it was
approved due to the lack of a director. Another struggle during the initial charter approval
timeline was lack of space. Once there was a director in place, the district asked the
director to commit to lease four classrooms for one hundred thousand dollars. The
director agreed. At the time both parties made this commitment, however, the school only
had one enrolled student: the teacher-principal's child. According to the interviewee,
another local charter school was having some problems at the time, and decided to move
their students over to his charter school. Because of this migration of students, they began
the school year with 10 students and eventually ended up with 23. The charter school was
open for one year during the 2005/2006 school year.
As we proceeded into the interview, the interviewee revealed that he was the
executive director overseeing a teacher-principal. He also noted that the initial founding
organization "fell off the map. We never had contact with them from day one. We took
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the charter document and we did the best we could implementing their vision. But they
were not involved."
The interviewee also felt that the sponsoring school district was not reasonable in
helping the school secure adequate or cost-effective space. The interviewee felt rushed to
open the school once the director was in place and the district had leased out its
classrooms. He stated, "I think if I had six months, I could have done a very strong
marketing effort in a very poor area and would have been able to solidify [enrollees]."
Not seeking renewal. According to the interviewee, the charter was up for
renewal in the 2006/2007 school year; however, the director and others associated with
the school [i.e. the charter school board]:
decided not to try to pursue getting it re-approved. It was too big of a bear. We
weren't servicing enough kids. It wasn't growing through word of mouth like we
would have thought. Facilities were an issue. It was just too difficult to keep
going.
Additionally, the interviewee felt that "the theme of the charter was limited in attracting
students [and their families] because it had a very liberal flair to it." By no uncertain
terms was the charter closed or revoked by the district sponsor. As stated by the
interviewee, "The laws that pertain to charter schools: fiscal responsibility, legality,
children learning... none of those pieces came into play [in the school's closure]." This
statement is supported by the documentation provided by the California Department of
Education, which states "lack of facilities" as the formal reason for the school's closure.
The Center for Education Reform, however, lists financial as the reason for closure, along
with inadequate enrollment. Both can be true, however, since it was financially
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impossible to maintain school operations with such a small student population and such a
relatively high lease price for classrooms from the district. No other feasible space
options were located or secured by the director.
The charter also closed, according to the interviewee, due to lack of enrollment.
The interviewee stated that "we told the teacher-principal, if you can't increase the
numbers, we have to release these students. We have to make a decision of what [we are]
going to do with these kids. There were still twenty-three bodies to take care of."
Although during the interview, multiple reasons were given for the school's
closure, the interviewee made the following statement as his open-ended survey response:
"Lack of space forced the school to mitigate marketing efforts for new students." The
director seemed to feel stuck between a rock and a hard place: the school couldn't
continue to lease such expensive classrooms from the district, but on the other hand, he
couldn't find comparable space; therefore, he couldn't increase the school's income
through student recruitment since he did not know whether or not adequate space would
be secured before the start of the next school year.
Throughout the interview, it was clear that the interviewee took responsibility for
the lack of a more assertive marketing campaign for the school, as well as the need to hire
people that had more experience with kindergarten through sixth grade education.
Furthermore, the interviewee felt that more stakeholders from the community should
have been involved in order to secure the school's status in the neighborhood and create
more of an interest in the school.
Advice. The interviewee elaborated on several key areas that he felt would allow
a charter school to exist and thrive. The key areas are: positive attitude, commitment,
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fiscal planning, alignment with an organization to secure physical space, and solid
guiding principles. This is what he said:
So to prevent closure, I think first it would have [required an] attitude that there's
no way this school is going to close down, and there's someone who's willing to
stay up the late nights and put their own house on the line for it to get it open and
keep it open. So, first it takes that highly influential point person, or that dedicated
point person who has a good reputation. [Secondly], it's staying committed to
trying to collaborate with the district that we're here to stay, we're looking for
renewal, and then having the growth that demonstrates that this is actually going
to work. [Third], someone who is cognizant of the planning piece needs to be
involved, which is, when do the monies come in and how long will those monies
carry us. [Fourth], align yourself with a church that will give you the one to two
year piece with room to grow, where you're not going to have to take stuff down
or put up, or if you are, there's a collaborative plan. Space is defined five months
before opening. So if you have that I think you're in great shape. That and,
[lastly], good guiding principles. You have schools that aren't offering the
specific needs that [were] identified prior to opening.
This interviewee also offered a no-nonsense sort of approach to the
recommendation of particular personnel in order to help a charter become successful:
So you always hear, you should have an attorney with your developers, you
should have an accountant, the business man, you should have the curriculum
person. That's all great. You can have varying levels of that. But you really need a
lot of common sense. You need people who understand people.
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Since this particular director was essentially running a school with a vision that
had already been created, the interviewee mentioned that there needs to be some sort of
cohesion between the developers of the school and those who implement the charter. This
interviewee also feels that a charter should "offer the niche that the district isn't
managing well. Don't go head-to-head [with district strategies that are already in place]."
The interviewee knew that this school definitely had a unique vision; however, the
commitment and marketability were not present in order to help the school survive.
Case Study Nine: "I'm Still Thinking My Mistake Was Sticking With It"
My ninth interviewee had more than nine years of experience as an educational
administrator before becoming the director of a charter school but did not possess a
teaching credential or an administrative credential. She declined to answer the question
regarding her educational background.
The charter school in this case was started by a pre-apprenticeship training
program that focused on the building trades for post-high school students. Due to the fact
that this charter school was created to fit a very specific need, this school could be
labeled as a Type F, or entrepreneur-initiated charter, based on the typology outlined in
Chapter Two. Similar to a previous case study, this school had a business partner who
initiated the charter petition, and was sponsored by the county office of education. The
interviewee stated that this not-for-profit business organization
decided to go for a charter school so that they could work with kids ninth through
twelfth grade. It was started as a charter school that was going to provide
academics and also do the building trades. The kids would enroll with the
vocational bent.
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The beginning. The charter petition was approved through the local county office
of education in 2004. At that time, the interviewee was a consultant with the non-profit
corporation involved in writing the charter petition. This corporation also ran post-high
school vocational training programs. The interviewee had prior experience working with
partnerships between charter schools and corporations. Initially, the charter school lacked
the enrollment that had been anticipated, so the school personnel decided to close the
school and then reopen the following year. The developers of the charter asked the
interviewee if she would be interested in serving as the director of the re-opened school,
and she accepted the position. The re-opened school received first-year status again from
the California Department of Education (CDE), because CDE felt that the charter school
had "acted responsibly in closing" due to the low enrollment. CDE documented the
official school start date as September 2005. This account is also reflected in an historical
summary of the school, contained in the approval of the charter school's closure,
provided by the superintendent at a board meeting in the spring of 2006.
The charter school itself never had its own governing board. The board members
of the original post-high school vocational training program, who had no prior experience
with charter schools, became the board members for the charter school. The local county
office of education sponsored the school officially; however, the corporation that
operated the vocational program ran the school on an operational basis.
In January of 2006, the school decided to move to an independent study model.
The school maintained an average daily attendance of 105 to 110 students, and, according
to the interviewee, "it worked very well. As a matter of fact, it worked better. We had
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less incidences with the kids, and they got that one-on-one hour every week with their
teacher."
Problems and closure. According to the interviewee, around the 2005/2006
school year, a new superintendent came on board at the county office of education. This
superintendent did not originally approve the charter petition and, according to the
interviewee, was not supportive of charter schools. In terms of advanced apportionment
and funding, the interviewee believed that the county office of education (COE)
did everything they could [to hinder us]. Things were signed late. Things were
held up, lost. We didn't get letters that they said they mailed to us. I mean, just all
kinds of things were going on that just really strapped us for money.
Additionally, the interviewee indicated that another problem was that the county office of
education "choked us financially. Meantime, the kids were flourishing, but that [positive
student achievement] has nothing to do with it." The interviewee suggested that the
county office of education withheld funding from the charter school which made it
difficult to operate.
There also seems to have been a very negative relationship between the
sponsoring agency (the COE) and the charter school that caused the director to feel
"hassled". The interviewee believed that the harassment was because the charter school
had come upon a "political struggle" between a new superintendent at the COE and the
COE's board. The interviewee stated the following:
The staff from the COE went to all of the school districts that were under them
and told their key people, their superintendents and other folks, not to refer any
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kids to our program, and in fact to tell them that it was an invalid program and
that they wouldn't get credits and stuff like that.
The decision-making process at the charter school level also seemed to have a
negative effect. The interviewee stated that most of the decisions and meetings were
between the board of the original vocational school and the COE. "We [at the school site]
were told what the decision was. They [the business partner] would come to me for
information like, 'What's the enrollment?' and 'What's the ADA?', 'Did you turn in the
reports?' That kind of thing." Due to the aftermath of this experience, the interviewee felt
that "no charter school should ever be run under a third tier. You [should] have your own
board of directors; you [should] have your own governance."
In the end, this interviewee believed that the charter school was closed because:
[the COE] just didn't want it. They just didn't want a charter school because of
the competition and the loss of ADA money. A lot of people will say that the
COE doesn't really get ADA. They're a county office of education, but they do.
They have community day schools and they have the probation [students] and
stuff like that. They do get money for that and those were the kids that we were
working with. It's a typical thing with charter schools. That's probably the biggest
hurdle is that you are working under your competition. Your competition is over
you. If you want to look at it in that respect, I don't think it should be competition.
I think that they should work together, and I think with successful charter schools,
there is a way to do it.
In her open-ended survey response, the interviewee stated the following: "The
charter was approved by the LEA's (Local Education Authority) Board of Trustees, but
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administrators did not approve and hindered many processes, including timely funding
and administrative assistance." This response reflects part of the negative relationship
the interviewee felt existed between the charter school itself, the business organization,
and the charter sponsor.
In a review of the minutes of county board of education meeting from the spring
of 2006, the non-profit corporation that ran the school notified the county office of
education in December 2005 that the school was not financially viable with its current
enrollment of approximately 96 students. The corporation recommended that the county
office of education close the school no later than the end of the 2005/2006 school year.
Also stated in the minutes was the following: "Due to financial difficulties, the school
unilaterally changed its program to a 100 percent independent study non-classroom
based program in January 2006, which was deemed a violation of the charter." The
approval of the closure of the school carried unanimously at the spring 2006 board
meeting. One of the board members stated that the "[charter] proposal was [initially]
reviewed with a fine toothed comb. It failed because it failed, not because the board
didn't do its job."
Advice. One piece of advice that the interviewee felt would make a big difference
with charter schools was to make community colleges and four-year colleges an LEA so
that they could sponsor charter schools like districts and county offices of education. That
way there would be an innate educational focus through the lens of an actual educational
institution, unlike the muddled and sometimes self-serving focus of the business entity in
this example.
The interviewee also thought that there were three items that must be addressed in
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order for a charter to be successful. First, the charter has to be sure that it is going to have
a good relationship with their sponsor. Second, the charter needs to be sure that the model
of the school is embedded in best practice, and that there are data available to prove that
the model does work. The interviewee knew that the vocational training program that
existed separate and prior to the charter school was successful, but integrating it into a
high school educational setting and eventually an independent study program was new.
There was not any data available to establish the viability of transplanting the vocational
training program model into a high school setting, and more research could have been
done to determine whether or not the model had a chance of being successful. Finally, the
charter school should not have what the interviewee calls a "third layer". The interviewee
suggested that the governance structure be comprised solely of the board of the charter
school and the board of the sponsoring agency. After some reflection, the interviewee
also added that community support is important.
Finally, the interviewee summed up her ideas regarding the need for charter
schools:
California doesn't know how many kids they are losing. I can tell you it's more
than they're telling, and it's a shame. The kids are not challenged. They're
frustrated. You talk to the kids and hear that they're not getting what they need to
get and it's not because they're stupid. So we need something. I think charter
schools help. It's one tool.
Conclusion
This chapter presented all nine qualitative interviews in case study format. The
interview data were triangulated with data from document analysis and the interviewees'
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responses on the surveys that were completed prior to the interviews. The following
chapter begins with a summary of cross-case findings and then provides suggestions for
policy and practice and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to the length of the previous case study descriptions, I have decided to
present the results of the cross-case analysis and directly respond to the two research
questions at the outset of this chapter. The second part of the chapter discusses studybased recommendations for policymakers and practitioners, as well as recommendations
for researchers who will continue the study of the reasons behind charter school closures.
A Summary of Cross-Case Findings
A Methodological Postscript
Before discussing the findings of my research, I must acknowledge once again the
flaws with this study. In the study's original design, the major focus was on collecting
survey data. The qualitative component was intended to merely add a bit of depth to the
survey data from a large sample of former directors of closed charter schools and what
they had to say about their closure experiences. Consequently, the plans for the
qualitative piece were much more modest than they would have been if the primary focus
was on creating qualitative case studies of the charter school closure experience at
various sites. There were not plans in this study, for example, to triangulate what the
former directors said through interviews with other key stakeholders.
After I discovered that the survey response rate was so low that the survey data
did not really contribute very much information, I was forced to make the case studies the
centerpiece of my study. Although I attempted to do whatever within-case study
triangulation was possible at that point by reviewing board meeting minutes, newspaper
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articles (when available), and the interviewee's own survey responses, this triangulation
effort was not nearly as detailed or as extensive as it should have been.
Consequently, I must emphasize yet again that the findings reported here, even
about the nine schools of focus, must be viewed with considerable caution. The case
studies do suggest some intriguing hypotheses about why schools closed and how the
likelihood of closure might be minimized; however, the operative word here is
hypotheses. The findings here must be supported by other studies, including some with
substantially larger samples, before any of the findings that are reported here can be
viewed as definitive.
Finally, I must conclude with the idea that many "first" studies generate
hypotheses from which to develop further study. Although the case studies could have
been developed more deeply, the stories from the nine individuals and the cross-case
analyses that were generated are valuable and provide both insight and perspectives that
have not been explored before.
Cross-case Analysis Results
Before proceeding with my announced organizational strategy, I should note that
there were many similarities, as well as some differences, among the qualitative interview
responses about the reasons that the interviewed former directors gave for the closure of
their charter schools. They also provided both similar and different pieces of advice to
others who wanted to start charter schools. These data are summarized in two matrices
located in the appendices that support the findings presented below. Appendix E contains
a matrix of similar themes reflecting the directors' reasons for closure. Appendix F
contains a matrix of similar themes reflecting the directors' advice for others wanting to
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start or maintain a charter school. The information contained in these two appendices has
been used to answer the study's research questions.
Research Question One: What Are the Reasons Former Charter School Leaders
Give for the Closure of Their Schools?
The reasons articulated by former directors. Conflict with the school's
sponsoring agent was a reason cited by five of the nine interviewees for school closure.
Some interviewees could document multiple examples of this conflict; others had only a
single example. The director interviewed for case study nine shared that their school's
sponsoring agency, a county office of education, "did everything they could [to hinder
us]. Things were signed late. Things were held up, lost. We didn't get letters that they
said they mailed to us."
A negative relationship with the district superintendent was a second theme found
in the qualitative interviews. Four of the nine interviewees, three of whom also cited
conflict with the sponsoring district as a major contributor to the school's closure, felt
that the district superintendent was "anti-charter" or "not a charter advocate."
Seven of the charter schools in this study were sponsored by school districts; two
were sponsored by county offices of education. Both of the directors of the schools that
were sponsored by a county office of education cited conflict with the sponsoring board
and a negative relationship with the superintendent as two reasons why they felt their
schools had closed.
A third theme, issues with securing or paying for facilities, was discovered in
three of the nine interviews. The director of the school in case study five said, "I couldn't
have foreseen the closing of the site that [the school] was going to be on. I don't know
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how you would guarantee something like that." In each of the three case studies in which
facilities were a factor in school closure, there was no mention of a negative relationship
with the district superintendent or their sponsoring agency.
A fourth theme, found in five of the nine interviews (see Appendix E), was
financial or budgetary issues. For example, these issues ranged from one interviewee
claiming to have personally financed the salaries of the teachers ("I took out a second
mortgage on my house to pay salaries, which I'm never going to see again"), to chargebacks that sponsoring agents or corporate partners were making to the schools that were
deemed excessive by the schools' directors. The following is one director's account:
I was not pleased with [our corporate partner] because they were taking a million
dollars a year in our state funding for their operating expenses. With my research
and my background, I know that three or four percent was overhead cost, but not
a million dollars. It was excessive.
A fifth theme was an ineffective, and sometimes dysfunctional, relationship
between the charter school and a business or corporate partner. This reason was cited in
all three of the case studies where there was a business or corporate partner. These
partnerships looked different in the three different case studies, although in two of the
case studies (three and seven), the directors named the same educational management
organization (EMO) as being problematic. In case study three, the for-profit EMO was
part of the inception of the school and partnered with the sponsoring district. According
to the director, this EMO provided little to no oversight on the charter school's governing
board or with day-to-day activities. In case study seven, the director stated the following
about the EMO, which was also viewed as problematic by the former director of school
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three: "We [the charter school] were accountable to them [the EMO], but there was no
back and forth."
The director of the school discussed in case study nine recalled that their business
partner was involved as part of the charter school governing board, but seemed to "not
understand charter school law. They didn't understand any charter school stuff. They
were very removed from the charter school." One common element among these three
case studies, however, was that the three interviewees felt that their relationships with
their corporate partners were anything but effective.
The sixth and final theme, found in case studies three and seven, was that the
schools closed partly because of questionable ethical behavior on the part of the business
partner. Here the emphasis goes well beyond simply having an unproductive relationship
between the school and the business partner, even though the accusations of unethical
behavior often contributed to unsuccessful working relationships. In fact, the ethical
lapses described could be construed, at times, as illegal behavior. Both schools that were
discussed in these two case studies could be considered entrepreneur-initiated.
The interviewee from case study three stated the following: "I think I could have
managed [the business partner], but it felt very yucky. It felt improper. It was ethically
wrong." The interviewee from case study seven also recounted that she questioned the
decisions and behaviors of the corporation. The corporation, in turn, supposedly told her
that she was going to be fired or would have to resign because they didn't like her stirring
things up.
A comparison of director's reasons with official reasons for closure. The
following matrix compares the documented reason for the closure of each school in this
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study with the reason(s) the directors gave for the closure of the school. The school type
is also included in order to further examine reasons for closure alongside the
characterization of the schools that closed.
Table 1
Discrepancies Between Documented Reasons and Directors' Reasons for Closures
Case study

Type According to

number

Wells, Lopez, Scott, and reason(s) for closure

closure as stated

Holme (1999) Typology

by directors

1

Documented

Reason(s) for

Urban/Ethnocentric/

Failure to make

Conflict with

Grassroots

academic progress

sponsoring board;
negative
relationship with
district or COE
superintendent;
financial/budget
issues

2

Founded by charismatic

Incomplete

Conflict with

educational leader

curriculum, an

sponsoring board;

unbalanced budget,

issues with

and an absence of a

facilities

secured facility
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Table 1 (continued)
3

Entrepreneur-initiated

Inadequate funding

Financial/budget
issues; ineffective
relationship with
business partner;
unethical behavior
by business partner

4

Urban/Ethnocentric/

Fiscal

Conflict with

Grassroots

mismanagement

sponsoring board;
negative
relationship with
district or COE
superintendent;
financial/budget
issues

5

Founded by charismatic

Low enrollment

educational leader

Conflict with
sponsoring board;
issues with
facilities

6

Parent-led

Reverted to non-

Chose to revert to

charter status

non-charter status

106

Table 1 (continued)
7

Entrepreneur-initiated

Mismanagement

Negative
relationship with
district or COE
superintendent;
financial/budget
issues; ineffective
relationship with
business partner;
unethical behavior
by business partner

8

9

Urban/Ethnocentric/

Lack of facilities;

Issues with

Grassroots

inadequate funding

facilities

Entrepreneur-initiated

Financial difficulties;

Conflict with

change in program

sponsoring board;

deemed violation of

negative

charter

relationship with
district or COE
superintendent;
financial/budget
issues; ineffective
relationship with
business partner
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One obvious reason for discrepancies between the third and fourth columns of the
matrix is that typically there is only one formal documented reason for closure, whereas
seven of the nine former directors felt that there were multiple reasons that contributed to
their charter school's closure. Their interpretation, in fact, was that the reasons for their
schools' closures were too complex to condense into one single reason.
Even with multiple reasons, there are some interesting patterns that can be
discerned from reviewing the contents of the matrix. For example, the interviewees in
case studies one and four cited the same three reasons for their schools' closures: lack of
support from their sponsoring agents' boards, a negative relationship with the district
superintendent, and financial or budgetary issues. Both of these schools could be
categorized as urban/ethnocentric/grassroots. Additionally, the data in case studies two
and five generated the same themes: lack of support from their sponsoring agents' boards,
and issues with facilities. These schools were the only two in this study that were
considered charters founded by charismatic educational leaders.
Case study six, a parent-led charter school, and case study eight, an
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots school, were the only two case studies in which the
directors cited a single reason for closure. Case study six was also the only school where
the official reason was exactly the same as what the director gave for the reason given for
closure. This consistency may have something to do with the fact that case study six was
this study's only conversion charter school and the only school that reverted back to
traditional public school status rather than simply closing the school building doors. The
director of this particular school was the only one who came across as apathetic to the
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loss of his school's charter status. From his perspective, there was no controversy and no
resistance from faculty or teachers to convert back once again to traditional school status.
There was also a close correspondence between the documented and director's
reason for closing in case study eight. According to the director associated with case
study eight, inadequate facilities were, indeed, the bottom-line cause of the closure. This
individual did, however, articulate a number of other contributing variables that played a
part in the closure process. These variables included insufficient student enrollment and
lack of an aggressive marketing campaign. The director explicitly linked these
intervening variables, however, with the school's facilities problems (specifically, the
cost of facilities), one of the official reasons found on California Department of
Education documentation.
Finally, case studies two, three, four, and nine had some overlap between the legal
reason for closure and the director's reasons for closure. In case study two, problems with
facilities was one of the reasons cited for closure. In case studies three, four, and nine,
funding or financial issues were found in both categories of closure data.
If case study six is included, which was the only case study that had an identical
official reason and director's reason for closure, five of the nine directors in this study
shared, at the very least, some alignment with the official reason(s) for their schools'
closures. These schools represented the four different types of charter schools in the
Wells et. al. typology discussed in earlier chapters of this study.
On the other hand, four of the directors felt that the official reason(s) given for the
closure of their schools were inaccurate at best. The types of charter schools represented
were those founded by a charismatic educational leader, entrepreneur-initiated, and
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urban/ethnocentric/grassroots. Although this data is not generalizable to other charter
schools that have closed given the number of case studies in this study, the idea that some
directors feel there is such a discrepancy in closure data is a component that warrants
further review and research.
Research Question Two: What Advice Do These Former Charter School
Leaders Offer to Those Who Are Interested in Starting or Continuing a Charter
School?
In terms of offering advice, there were two themes that surfaced in five different
case studies. The first theme, found in case studies one, three, four, seven and eight, was
the need to secure and control finances. This particular advice was offered by the
directors of all of the schools in this study that could be considered
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots, and by two of the directors of schools that could be
regarded as entrepreneur-initiated. In hindsight, these directors felt it was imperative to
know where money was coming from, where it was going, and who "held the purse
strings." The director of case study seven, for example, stated, "You have to know where
the money is. The money was the big key in the running of the school because you can't
do things without the funding."
A second theme that was found in five of the nine case studies (case studies two,
six, seven, eight and nine) involved the perceived need to develop and maintain a
collaborative relationship with the charter school's sponsoring agency or the sponsoring
agency's superintendent. These schools embody all four of the Wells et. al. types
represented in this study. The director of case study six, for example, believed this
relationship was important because the charter school could be closed at the "whim" of
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the district. Interestingly this school was not closed, according to the director and official
documentation, for reasons that reflect an adversarial relationship with its sponsoring
district. The director of case study eight also emphasized that "staying committed to
trying to collaborate with the district [reinforces that the charter school] is here to stay
[and that the school is] looking for renewal."
The third advice theme, which was found in case studies six, seven, eight and
nine, was the importance of beginning a charter school with a vision or specific objective.
The directors that shared this piece of advice came from the study's only parent-led
charter, an urban/ethnocentric/grassroots charter, and two entrepreneur-initiated charters.
The director of case study nine (an entrepreneur-initiated charter with a business
partnership) noted that this vision or objective should be based on "best practice," and
that there should be "data to prove the model."
The directors of case studies one, three, and nine (one
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots and two entrepreneur-initiated) also suggested that a
business entity should not operate a charter school. Interestingly, case study one was not
operated by a business. Nevertheless, the director of case study one stated plainly: "I
don't think business people should be running charters. Many are." In a bit of a
contradiction, however, this same director also stated that she would recommend "hiring
a business person or business firm" to conduct the business aspect of the charter school.
One final point about the advice about charters and for-profit business: Case study seven
was operated by an EMO, but the former director did not offer the sort of advice that the
directors in cases one, three and nine provided.

Ill
Another advice-related theme, found in case studies six and eight (parent-led and
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots), was the recommendation to maintain a high level of
enthusiasm and energy. The interviewee associated with case study eight believed that
there needs to be an "attitude that there's no way this school is going to close down.
Someone [needs to be willing] to stay up the late nights and put their own house on the
line to get [the charter school] open and keep it open."
The director of case study five, a charter school categorized as being founded by a
charismatic educational leader, classified her advice under what she believed could have
been done differently in order to keep her school open. This director cited the need for a
larger student population (low enrollment happened to be the legal reason why the school
closed, but it was not one of the reasons she cited for why the school closed). Instead, her
advice focused on the need to have a large potential applicant pool. In fact, she stated that
she believed access to large numbers of students was the reason many charter schools
wanted to be in urban areas, because "you have a lot of kids to draw from."
Although none of the directors suggested "knowing charter school law" as a
specific form of advice to give to others, data from four of the case studies reflect that the
directors strongly believed that if they were more privy to charter school law, aware of
changes in the law, or knew how to enforce the law, their particular schools may still be
open today.
The director of case study two, a charter founded by a charismatic educational
leader, believed her school would have stayed open if the state would have "enforced
charter school rules, because we should not have been held to the memorandum of
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understanding [with the sponsoring district]. The charter school law is what should apply.
The state wasn't willing to enforce the law in any way."
The director of case study three, an entrepreneur-initiated charter school, shared
that her and her staff should have been constantly aware of "the most recent rules,
regulations, and laws that are going to impact [the school's] funding."
In case study nine, another entrepreneur-initiated charter school, the director
thought that the school's business partner should have exercised its "legal rights" to make
the school's sponsoring agent (a county office of education) aware that the business felt
that the COE was not fulfilling its responsibilities as an authorizing agent.
Finally, the director of the only parent-led charter school in the study thought that
his school would still be a charter school today "if the school district hadn't come to us
and said with the new changes in law, you're going to cost us more money as a charter
school."
After looking at the data and types of schools associated with each piece of
advice, the advice spans across the different types of schools represented in this study
from the Wells et. al. typology. There is no single piece of advice that comes from the
directors of one particular type of charter school.
When it came to the professional experience and education of the directors
included in this study, five had less than three years of administrative experience prior to
directing their respective charter schools. The educational backgrounds of these five
ranged from "some graduate school" to doctoral degrees. Three directors had more than
nine years of experience prior to directing their charter schools: one of these directors had
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a bachelor's degree, one had a master's degree, and one had a doctoral degree. One
director had approximately six years of experience with a master's degree.
Three of the five directors that recommended the advice of "securing and
controlling finances" had less than three years of administrative experience prior to
directing their charter schools. Three of the five directors that suggested the importance
of "developing and maintaining collaboration and relationships with sponsoring agency"
also had been an administrator for less than three years before joining or starting their
charter schools. Two of these directors recommended this advice in addition to "securing
and controlling finances." The more experienced administrators, however, were still
represented in these advice groups.
None of the five advice themes were limited to either the fairly inexperienced
directors or the more seasoned directors. This may suggest that the advice generated from
these charters' closures can be attributed to the nature of being a charter school
(particularly a start-up charter school), and that the closures cannot entirely be ascribed to
administrative lack of experience.
Summary
The revised purpose of this study was to 1) ascertain both the legal and directorstated reasons for some California charter school closures and 2) explore what advice
administrators of closed charter schools would give to those wanting to open, or continue
to operate, a viable charter school. Although this dissertation was initially designed as a
mixed-methodology study, the resulting research focused on nine qualitative interviews,
which were triangulated with the interviewees' survey responses and document analysis.
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In the qualitative interviews, the administrators' stated reasons for the closures
fell into six themes: conflict with the sponsoring board, negative relationship with the
sponsoring district or COE superintendent, issues with facilities, financial or budgeting
issues, ineffective collaboration with a business partner, and questions of ethical behavior
by a business partner. Five of the nine interviewees felt their schools closed primarily
because of a negative relationship with their charter sponsor, which in all cases was their
local district's school board or county office of education. Five of the nine interviews
referred to fiscal problems as one of the major reasons for the school's closure. Four of
the nine interviewees mentioned that a negative relationship with the superintendent of
the district or COE that granted the charter contributed to the school's downfall. Among
these three themes, case studies one, four, and nine cited all three as reasons why they felt
their schools closed. Case studies one and four could be typed as
urban/ethnocentric/grassroots; case nine could be considered entrepreneur-initiated and
had a partnership with a business. There seem to be few similarities among the schools
and their directors, other than their reasons for closure.
Five of the nine interviewees (case studies one, three, four, seven, and nine) felt
that, in order to maintain or open a successful charter school, the administrator needs to
have secure control over the finances and budget of the school (see Appendix F).
Additionally, five directors (case studies two, six, seven, eight, and nine) also said that
the development and maintenance of relationships with the sponsoring agency will
positively impact a charter school. Five of nine (case studies one, six, seven, eight, and
nine) cited that a charter school director must begin with a vision or specific objective
that everyone can rally around. Of these three responses, case studies seven and eight
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included all three pieces of advice in their responses. Interestingly enough, these two case
studies are different types within the Wells et. al. typology that closed for different
reasons.
Recommendations
A study with an n of nine has inevitable limitations that must be acknowledged.
On the other hand, such a study can have considerable heuristic value if it highlights
issues to consider and hypotheses to test in other situations. This study lends itself to a
variety of recommendations for those in the charter school field. Additionally, leaders
and school reform enthusiasts in the traditional public school system may also benefit
from the results of this study. I have formulated several recommendations after analyzing
the data.
Policy and Practice
First, there seems to be a need for a formal support network among new charter
school directors. Many of the directors in this study lacked an administrative credential,
and although this may not have directly contributed to the school closure, the study
participants clearly voiced the need for additional support, especially when it came to
legal and financial issues, as reported earlier in this chapter. To be sure, there are
networks, such as the California Charter School Association, that offer support and
advice, but none of the interviewees mentioned those agencies as influential in their
tenure as charter school directors. Although the interviewees were not asked specifically
about support they received from agencies outside of their sponsoring agencies, two of
the former directors mentioned attending a training or workshop designed to support
charter school operators prior to opening their respective schools.
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There are some associations in the state that sponsor workshops and support for
charter schools in general; however, these directors seemed to have needed something
more: something specific to their needs and abilities beyond having a passion to serve a
particular community, wanting to address the needs of an underserved population of
students, or desiring more freedom from district rules and regulations. It is still unclear as
to whether or not the existence of CMOs (Charter Management Organizations) as a
means of support has any impact on the sustainability of charter schools, particularly
schools with new or inexperienced leadership, since they were not mentioned as a
component in any of the case studies included in this research. CMOs, according to the
Center on Reinventing Public Education (2007), are non-profit organizations that seek to
manage charter schools by replicating successful schools in multiple locations.
Under the umbrella of support, each sponsoring agency should provide the charter
school with a neutral charter school liaison who is available to help with charter renewal,
procedural information, and other operating issues. Many of the directors I interviewed
had powerful visions for their schools, but little practical experience.
Businesses or corporations that choose to partner with charter schools,
particularly those that are funding sources for the schools, should require their personnel
to be trained in areas of charter school law and education in general. In fact, charter
schools that are seeking business partners should insist on appropriate preparation for the
business so that the elements of charter school law and/or operation are clearly
understood.
The following table reflects statements made by each of the three directors whose
schools worked with or were managed by a business or educational management
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organization (EMO). Since this data comes from directors of charter schools that have
closed, the data suggest that there is a need for businesses involved in charter school
management or support to become aware of the specificities that come with operating
charter schools.
Table 2
Statements by Directors That Reflect the Need for Business or EMO to Know Charter
School Law and/or Operation
Case study number

Supporting quote

3

"[The EMO] needed knowledge of how
[charter] schools work within the system,
how funding happens, what the
mechanisms of support are."

7

"The business [EMO] didn't know what
they were doing. I think they got in over
their heads."

9

"[Our business partner] didn't have a
handle on the educational system and how
it works. They really didn't understand
charter school law at all."

Further Research
The charter school field would benefit from a much more securely triangulated
study that utilizes more quantitative data to support qualitative research. Due to the fact
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that I asked people to share what could be considered significant failures in their
professional lives, I, undoubtedly, should have anticipated with much greater certainty
that I would have encountered difficulty collecting responses to the quantitative surveys.
Further research, perhaps, could focus on more recent closures first, so that
contact information is more current and accessible. Additionally, more qualitative data
are needed to tell the story of charter school closures. This data should come from
multiple stakeholders, including parents, students, teachers, and representatives from the
sponsoring agencies, as well as former directors.
Because of the problems associated with finding information for this study, it is
recommended that a newly created central database be established to collect information
on closed charter schools. As a part of the closure process, charter schools would be
required to submit a report to this database that would document, among other things, the
years of operation, the sponsoring agent, and the documented legal reason for closure.
Some organizations have attempted this sort of documentation; however, after a crossanalysis of documents, it was discovered that some schools were present in one
document, but not another. Due to the lack of organization of information surrounding
charter school closures, any information that can be accessed on one place would be a
first step in benefiting the field as a whole.
Conclusion
The unanticipated consequences that resulted from this study will certainly be of
some use in the context of future charter school research, particularly when it comes to
charter school closures.
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This study, in fact, demonstrates how difficult it is to locate individuals for a
study regarding an event that already has occurred; it is exponentially more difficult to
locate people willing to participate in a study in which they may have contributed to the
closure of a school.
When individuals were located, they more than likely shared one side of the
charter school closure story, in order to ensure that they did not take sole (or in some
cases, any) responsibility for their particular charter school's closure. Even if the former
directors knew that their actions had a substantial impact on the closure of the school,
they probably would not fully disclose the full account of their own personal failure.
What we do not find in a study of this nature is equally as important as what we
do find. Since none of the charter schools examined in this study were considered
teacher-led charter schools (according to the Wells, Lopez, Scott, and Holme typology), it
would be important to determine whether or not teacher-led charters are more successful
than the other typologies of charter schools, or, at the very least, why they might be less
likely to close. What, if anything, is different about teacher-led charters?
Conversely, the majority of schools examined in this study were considered
charter schools guided by charismatic leaders or schools that were founded to serve a
specific population of underserved students (urban/grassroots/ethnocentric). Are these
schools just simply more likely to close? Or are the leaders of these schools, because of
their personalities, more willing to participate in this sort of study so that their voices are
heard?
Charter schools, and those that lead them, are not only dynamic, but they possess
the potential to be influential in the realm of school reform. We certainly can learn from
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charter schools that thrive; on the other hand we can, and should, continue to learn from
those that are less successful as long as there are those who are willing to share their
stories in order to have an impact on our educational system.
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Appendix A
Introduction Letter for Quantitative Surveys
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To Whom It May Concern:
My name is Jennifer Reiter-Cook, and I am a doctoral student at the University of
San Diego. I obtained your contact information through a list of closed and revoked
charter schools on the California Department of Education website. I would be incredibly
grateful if you would be willing to participate in my dissertation study regarding charter
schools that have closed. Information from this study will contribute to knowledge in the
field of charter schools, especially for those who are interested in becoming charter
school sponsors or operators, as well as institutions that are involved in providing
professional development for charter school leaders.
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at any
time. Data collected prior to withdrawal by the participant will not be used, unless the
participant gives permission through writing. Your personal information will be kept
confidential.
You can assist by filling out a survey that will be sent to you in one week. This
survey will ask your opinion regarding the closure of the school that you managed. The
information you provide will help those interested in charter schools by allowing your
experiences to be shared. Additionally, there will be no public association between your
name and your survey responses.
After the surveys have been collected, I might contact you regarding a follow-up
interview. You may choose to participate in the interview or not.
Please respond to this email if you would be willing to complete the survey. If
you have any questions, you can reach me at jcook 105(alcox.net or (619) 962-1342.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
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Appendix B
Charter School Closure Survey
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1.1 have read the introductory letter that accompanied the survey link, and agree to
voluntarily answer the following 18 survey questions.
Yes
No
Please answer the following questions about your professional experience and
preparation.
2. Prior to administrating at the charter school, how long had you been an administrator?
Less than 1 year
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-9 years
More than 9 years
3. What is your educational background?
Bachelor's Degree
Some graduate school
Master's Degree
Doctoral Degree
Other
4. Do you hold a teaching credential?
Yes
No
5. Do you hold an educational administrative credential?
Yes
No
Please respond to the following statements based on your experience with a charter
school closure.
6. Loss of facilities led to the closure of the charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree

Strongly Disagree

7. Other problems with facilities led to the closure of the charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
8. Personnel issues contributed to the closure of my charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
9. Lack of trainings and/or professional development opportunities for myself and my
staff led to the closure of the charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
10. Lack of proper financial management led to the closure of my charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
11. Low student enrollment led to the closure of the charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
12. Lack of appropriate student achievement led to the closure of my charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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13. There was little or no growth in student achievement while the charter school was in
existence.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
14. There were no ethical violations that led to the closure of the charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
15. The charter school operated under principles of fairness and decency.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
16. The charter school I worked for closed solely for the legal reasons stated.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
17. Analyzing formal closure documents for the school would give a clear and complete
picture of the reasons for my charter school's closure.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
18.1 have an opinion as to how I would do things differently if I were managing the
closed charter school again.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
19.1 have advice to give to those who want to begin or work in a charter school.
Strongly agree
Agree
Not sure
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
20. Please list any reasons other than those offered above as possible contributing factors
to your charter school's closure. You may also use this space to elaborate on any of your
answers to the survey items above.
21. If you would like to be contacted to be interviewed regarding the responses on this
survey, please enter your email address and/or phone number below:

Thank you very much for your time in completing this survey.
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Appendix C
University of San Diego
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study
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Jennifer Reiter-Cook, a doctoral student in the Leadership Studies program in the School
of Education at the University of San Diego, is conducting research on the closure of
charter schools and information that can benefit current and future charter school
operators by alerting them to factors that led to the closure of other charter schools.
1.

Participants will be interviewed between 45 minutes to one hour per interview,
with a maximum of two interviews.
2. Participants will be given a brief background and overview of the study. The
researcher will explain the interview process, and ensure each participant have an
understanding of their rights as participants in the study.
3. The interview will be conducted at a location that is acceptable to the participant,
at a time that will not interfere with the participants' work or other
responsibilities.
4. Interviews will be recorded and transcribed.
5. Efforts will be undertaken to ensure confidentiality by keeping data in a locked
cabinet or password protected file on the computer, through the use of
pseudonyms, and by giving participants an opportunity to review their transcripts
and delete material that might identify them, confidentiality cannot be
guaranteed. Data will be destroyed after 5 years, following completion of the
dissertation project.
6. Although these efforts will be undertaken to ensure confidentiality, risks of
participants being identified by others in the field are possible.
7. Information from this study will contribute to knowledge in the field of charter
schools, especially for those who are interested in becoming charter school
sponsors or operators, as well as institutions that are involved in providing
professional development for charter school leaders.
8. Participation in this study is voluntary. A participant may withdraw from the
study at any time. Data collected prior to withdrawal by the participant will not
be used, unless the participant gives permission through writing.
9. If a participant has any questions about this study, or activities that occur during
the course of this study, he or she may contact Jennifer Reiter-Cook at 619-9621342 Gcookl05@cox.net), or Dr. Robert Donmoyer at 619-260-7445
(donmoyer@cox.net), the faculty advisor for this study.
10. The information collected will be used to complete class assignments and may
also be used in other publications the author writes about the topic of this study.
11. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that which is expressed on this
consent form.
I, the undersigned, understand the above conditions and give my consent to my voluntary
participation in the research that has been described.
Signature of Interviewee
Printed Name
Contact Information:

Date

Phone (
Email

Address
)
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Interview Guide
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Knowledge
a) The participant will be given the opportunity to create a timeline
regarding their involvement in the charter school through its closure. The
guide questions that follow will be used a) if the participant chooses not to
participate in the timeline activity or b) if there are gaps in the information
presented in the timeline that need to be clarified.
b) What are your experiences in relation to your charter school closure?
• When did you become involved?
• Who else was involved?
• Who was responsible for drafting charter petition?
• What issues/problems, if any, were present from the beginning?
• What strengths were evident?
• Who had significant influence in decision-making processes?
Opinions
a) Leading up to closure: what was going on?
b) Closure of school: why do you feel the school closed? Does this differ
from documented reasons?
c) Preventive measures: what could have been done, in your opinion, to keep
the school open?
d) Advice: what do others need to know about opening/maintaining a charter
school?

136

Appendix E
Qualitative Interview Cross-Case Analysis Matrix: Reasons for Closure

137

Case study numbers

Theme generated

Supporting quotes

1,2,4,5,9

Conflict with, or lack of

Interview 1: "I reached out

support from, sponsoring

and said I wanted to talk

board

about [the renewal
application] prior to the
renewal and they never
responded."
Interview 2: "We found out
from the lenders we were
seeking that [the sponsoring
district] was telling them not
to invest with us because
they were going to take the
petition."
"We'd hire a teacher and a
week later she'd be offered a
position in [a district
school]."
Interview 4: "The mandate
[from the county office of
education (COE)] was that
we would start school
number two by the second
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year. We did that, but now
how are we going to pay for
this? So [the COE] said,
'It's not our problem. We're
not a lending institution and
we're not a loan institution
either so if you cannot
sustain yourself, we're
going to close you down.'"
Interview 5: "One of the
huge [problems] was the
board support. I had to wait
for five months before
they'd say they'd take the
[grant] money [from the
state]."
Interview 9: The county
office of education (COE)
"did everything they could
[to hinder us]. Things were
signed late. Things were
held up, lost. We didn't get
letters that they said they

139

mailed to us."
1,4,7,9

Negative relationship with

Interview 1: "[The

superintendent

superintendent] came on the
spring of our first year. In
the fall, we had a big grant
and he was sitting on the
check, he didn't issue the
check."
"Our superintendent doesn't
talk to people."
Interview 4: "Word came to
me that [the new county
superintendent] was very
anti-charter, and I was told
to keep everything up
because [the superintendent]
is out to close [charter]
schools down."
Interview 7: "There was a
change in admin in the
district halfway through
which changed the whole
complexion. The first
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superintendent was looking
at the charter school as
bringing in money to the
district. She retired, and then
the second superintendent
looked at charter schools as
being problems and not
seeing it as a benefit to the
district, and so the
relationship went way
downhill when the
administration changed."
Interview 9: The new
superintendent "inherited
[the charter school] and
didn't want it. He's not a
charter school advocate."
2,5,8

Issues with facilities

Interview 2: "[The district]
said that we were out of a
building, even though we
had another building."
Interview 5: "I couldn't have
foreseen the closing of the
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site that [the school] was
going to be on. I don't know
how you would guarantee
something like that."
Interview 8: "If the district
didn't drag their feet, and
they were more reasonable
in finding us space, if they
collaborated instead of 'You
are on your own'. I couldn't
personally make it happen."
1,3,4,7,9

Financial/Budget issues

Interview 1: "I took out a
second mortgage on my
house to pay salaries, which
I'm never going to see
again."
Interview 3: "The school
district was inappropriately
collecting high fees from us.
The contract [with the
business partner] which was
around 22/23 percent was
excessive."
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The business partner "didn't
tell us that there was all this
money sitting in reserve.
Not having any access to the
detail, we very much had the
impression that we were
going bankrupt."
Interview 4: "We were not
able to financially maintain
the school."
Interview 7: "I was not
pleased with the [business
running the school] because
they were taking a million
dollars a year in our state
funding for their operating
expenses. And with my
research and my
background, I know that 3
percent, 4 percent was
overhead cost, but not a
million dollars. It was
excessive."
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Interview 9: The county
office of education "choked
us financially. Meantime,
the kids were flourishing,
but that has nothing to do
with it."
Charter worked ineffectively

Interview 3: "The oversight

with business partner

was, as far as I could tell,
not very much of anything."
Interview 7: "That
entrepreneurial thing of
having a company running a
school I don't think was a
good idea. I think that that
was the downfall of the
school."
Interview 9: The business
running the charter school
"did not understand charter
school law. They didn't
understand any charter
school stuff. They were very
removed from the charter
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school."
3,7

Questioned ethical behavior

Interview 3: "The oversight

by business partner

as far as I can tell was not
much of anything. There
was no teacher training.
There was no oversight of
work. There was no
verification of what sorts of
materials were purchased
with the budgets they were
given to buy things. There
were rumors of trips to
Hawaii."
"I think I could have
managed [the business
partner], but it felt very
yucky. It felt improper. It
was ethically wrong."
Interview 7: "I was
questioning a lot of things.
They basically told me that I
was going to be fired or
[would have to] resign
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because they didn't like
what I was leading the
school into getting in with
the district."
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Appendix F
Qualitative Interview Cross-Case Analysis Matrix: Similar Advice

Interview Numbers

Theme generated

Supporting quotes

1,3,4,7,8

Secure and control finances

Interview 1: "A million
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[dollars is] about right."
"A million dollars in the
bank. I'm deadly serious
about that."
Interview 3: "The people
who are directly running the
day to day operations [need
to] have a handle on the
budget."
Interview 4: "If [charter
schools] don't have any
money, stay out of the
business. That's all there is
to it."
Interview 7: "You have to
know where the money is.
The money was the big key
in the running of the school
because you can't do things
without the funding."
"We had a school site
council yet we could make
no decisions or anything
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because there was no
knowledge of what our
budget was really."
Interview 8: "Someone who
is cognizant of the planning
piece needs to be involved,
which is, when do the
monies come in and how
long will those monies carry
us."
Develop and maintain

Interview 2: "It doesn't

collaboration and

matter what kind of

relationships with

relationship you may have

sponsoring agency or other

with the district, it is the

district representative

relationship with that person
at the oversight with the
charter school that is really
going to be the playing
point."
Interview 6: "You've got to
have the support of that
district because you could
be a little bit at the whim of
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that district."
Interview 7: "Strong tie to a
district office so that the
district was really a
proponent of the school,
that the district participated
in the operation of the
school."
"You have to have solid
backing of the district
because charter schools
have to be sponsored by the
district. You have to have a
good relationship person
right there with the
superintendent because if
the superintendent isn't pro,
it's not going to work you."
Interview 8: "It's staying
committed to trying to
collaborate with the district
that we're here to stay,
we're looking for renewal,
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and then having the growth
that demonstrates that this is
actually going to work."
Interview 9: "You can have
the relationship with the
board, the board can
approve [the charter], but
it's the relationship with
[the superintendent and his
top staff people]. He can
take [items] to the board
and get the support."
6, 7, 8, 9

Begin with a vision or

Interview 6: "My first

specific objective

question [if someone
wanted to start a charter
school] would be, why?"
Interview 7: "You need to
have a goal out there that
this is what you want to
achieve. With this school,
ours was to meet the needs
of the population that was
not fitting in to the regular
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public schools. It has to be
clear defined and you have
to have a vision of how
you're going to meet that."
Interview 8: "Offer the
niche that the district isn't
managing well. Don't go
head to head."
Interview 9: "Make sure
that the model that you have
is best practice. You [need
to have] data that proves
this model."
Business entity should not

Interview 1: "I don't think

operate school

business people should be
running charters. Many
are."
Interview 3: "A 100%
business approach is not
student centered and won't
work."
Interview 9: "Make sure
you don't have a third layer.
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I highly suggest that it's the
charter school and
authorizing agency, period."
6,8

Maintain high level of

Interview 6: "If you try and

energy/enthusiasm

[run the charter] by
yourself, there just won't be
enough energy to do that
and run the school. You
need to have a lot of buy
in."
Interview 8: "I think first it
would have been attitude
that there's no way this
school is going to close
down, and there's someone
who's willing to stay up the
late nights and put their own
house on the line to get it
open and keep it open."

